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THE PERILS OF UNIVERSAL ACCOMMODATION:
THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF
2003 AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OF
147,096,000 SOULS
James A. Sonne*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the scene. You manage a clothing store in Columbia,
South Carolina. A new employee approaches you with a request. He
begins by telling you that he belongs to the "Church of the Crystal
Serpent" and that, as such, he must "handle snakes" while "scrying"
(gazing into a crystal ball) at regular intervals ten times a day, and
have every other Friday off.' Because some "handling" intervals fall
during regular work hours, he asks for relevant ten-minute breaks in
which to "practice his religion." The employee also seeks to ventilate
his locker (at a cost of $300) for storing his snakes, and asks that the
break room mirror be lowered (at a cost of $150) so that, as is his
religious practice, he may "lie with snakes and gaze for images of a
past life." It is undisputed that there is no other way for him both to
practice his religion and to work for you. Citing actual burdens that
would result, such as changes to the seniority policy for scheduling
shifts, efficiency losses for the breaks, coworker and customer safety
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan;
B.A., Duke University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I thank Matthew Brower, Roger
Kiska, and Peter Mansfield for their research; Richard Myers and Stephen Safranek
for their insights; and Ave Maria School of Law for its support.
1 This hypothetical is based upon a combination of two activities, serpent han-
dling and scrying, that are presently justified on religious grounds. For background
on the former, see THOMAS BURTON, SERPENT-HANDLING BELIEVERS passim (1993); for
the latter, see THEODORE BESTERMAN, CRYSTAL GAzING: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY, Dis-
TRIBUTION, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SCRYING passim (photo. reprint n.d.); and see
also Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 898, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(discussing "wicca," in which scrying is a practice, as a "religion" under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)).
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risks, and the costs associated with both the locker and mirror,2 you
deny his requests for accommodation. Under current law, you would
almost certainly be within your rights. If the proposed Workplace Re-
ligious Freedom Act of 2003 (WRFA 2003 or "the Act")3 were
adopted, however, you could be liable for a civil rights violation. Are
we just seeing things, or is there something in the grass?
As the hypothetical suggests, WRFA 2003 would mandate that em-
ployers indulge the religious practices of employees in a radical way.
In proposing an accommodation standard hastily drawn from the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),4 the Act maintains an
inappropriate conception of religion and its practice that results in
employer burdens without precedent in employment or constitutional
law. As in the ADA, the Act would require that employers bear every-
thing short of "significant difficulty or expense" in accommodating
employees, 5 but unlike the ADA, which contemplated coverage of a
distinct minority (approximately forty-three million) defined largely
through objective physical or mental limitations,6 the Act could de-
mand similar affirmative action for virtually every member of the
workforce (approximately 147 million) 7 by an almost limitless defini-
tion of religion. 8 In its essence, the Act so protects religious practice
to the detriment of other interests that it poses a great threat not only
2 Although potential violations of criminal law arising from the proposed relig-
ious practice of "snake handling" might also serve as a burden, South Carolina main-
tains a Religious Freedom Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (Law. Co-op. 2002), which
would presumably exempt this religiously motivated practice.
3 S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (2000).
5 Compare id. § 12,111(10) (A), with S. 893 § 2(a)(4) (using similar factors to de-
fine the "significant difficulty or expense" standard of "undue hardship").
6 The ADA, which requires accommodation in employment, public services, and
public accommodations, estimated its total class at "some 43,000,000 Americans" at its
passage in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (a) (1).
7 WRFA 2003, as an amendment to Title VII, would protect both applicants and
employees. See S. 893 § 2(a)(4); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Therefore, it would
cover anyone who does (or could) work for employers otherwise regulated by Title
VII (generally, employers with fifteen or more employees). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
As of June 2003, the size of the civilian labor force in the United States was
147,096,000 people. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment
Situation: June 2003 (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/
archives/empsit.nr.htm.
8 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is the
agency chiefly responsible for enforcing Title VII, defines religion "to include moral
or ethical beliefs," 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2003), and, perhaps rightly, does not demand
an objective assessment of content. See MICHAEL WOLF ET AL., RELIGION IN THE WORK-
PLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 32 (1998).
Yet, consequently, the total size of the civilian workforce becomes the proper measure
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to the ability of business to function, but also to the ultimate under-
standing of individual rights within the broader community.
In addressing the threat posed by WRFA 2003, this Article pro-
ceeds in five parts. As introduction, Part I provides an overview of the
Act's core errors, particularly in its understanding of religion and its
practice. Part II traces the origins and development of religious ac-
commodation in employment, from the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to the present, and, thus, sets the
balance due to be upset by the Act. Part III discusses the Act's adop-
tion of the ADA model, while Parts IV and V, respectively, analyze the
massive practical and theoretical consequences for using this model
for religious matters. On the whole, this Article posits that the Act
advances an accommodation mandate that would severely injure the
proper relationship between individual rights and the rational opera-
tion of the workplace.
I. GREETING THE DILEMMA
In this most recent Congress, Senator Rick Santorum introduced
WRFA 2003 for Senate consideration. 9 This legislation, which had
been submitted and rejected in several earlier House or Senate ver-
sions since 1994,10 would ostensibly expand federal protection for re-
ligious activity in the workplace.11 The Act would achieve this through
changes to Title VII, which protects against discrimination on the ba-
sis of "religion,"12 and its 1972 amendment of section 701(j), which
adds to this protection an employer obligation of "reasonable accom-
modation" for "all aspects of religious observance and practice" of em-
ployees unless it would impose an "undue hardship" on the
employer. 13 In particular, the Act would amend Title VII by defining
the previously undefined term of "undue hardship" as "requiring sig-
nificant difficulty or expense."14 In so doing, it would reverse deci-
of coverage given that the adoption of protected beliefs (or practices) is, at least in
theory, available to all.
9 See S. 893.
10 For earlier Senate and House versions of the Act, see S. 2572, 107th Cong.
(2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1668, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2948,
105th Cong. (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.
4117, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1996); and H.R. 5233, 103d Cong.
(1994).
11 See 149 CONG. REc. S5352-53 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Santorum).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
14 See S. 893 § 2(a)(4).
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sions by the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the "undue hardship"
requirement of section 701 (j) as mandating anything more than a "de
minimis" expense, 15 and would replace this lower threshold with the
much more demanding ADA "significant difficulty or expense" stan-
dard.16 The net result would be a greater burden on employers that
would, according to presidential hopeful John Kerry, a co-sponsor of
the Act, "help assure that employers have a meaningful obligation to
reasonably accommodate their employees' religious practices."17
At first blush, the Act sounds reasonable and uncontroversial,
particularly in light of the nation's increased sensitivity to religious
discrimination in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001,18 and
the seeming religiosity of modern Americans (e.g., "nearly ninety-five
percent . . .say that they believe in God or a universal spirit"19). In
fact, the Senate bill is co-sponsored by such ideologically diverse sena-
tors as Hillary Clinton and Orrin Hatch. 20 Upon further review, how-
ever, the proposal is fraught with problems, not only for the business
and employer interests that are its traditional opponents, 2I but for re-
ligious and government concerns as well. Moreover, although this will
not be discussed directly here, due to its treatment by others and its
range beyond the employment topics at hand, the Act may also face
15 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) ("To require
[an employer] to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [an employee]
Saturdays off is an undue hardship.").
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10) (A).
17 See 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
18 See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS ABOUT EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MUSLIMS,
ARABS, SOUTH ASIANS, AND SIKHS 1 (2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/
backlash-employer.html [hereinafter EEOC] ("[R]eaction to the events of September
11, 2001 may demand increased efforts to prevent discrimination.").
19 Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VlI's Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protec-
tion of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
575, 576 (2000) (citing Jeffery L. Sheler* Spiritual America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 48).
20 The original sponsors are Senators Brownback (R., Kan.), Clinton (D., N.Y.),
Corzine (D., N.J.), Ensign (R., Nev.), Hatch (R., Utah), Kerry (D., Mass.), Lieberman
(D., Conn.), Mikulski (D., Md.), Murray (D., Wash.), Santorum (R., Pa.), and Smith
(R., Or.). See S. 893, 108th Cong. pmbl. (2003).
21 See Kevin Eckstrom, Bill Aimed at Protecting Faith While on the Job, WASH. POST,
May 10, 2003, at B8 ("Business lobbyists have stalled attempts to advance the bill for
almost a decade.").
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problems under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 22
by virtue of its special treatment of religious practice. 23
Perhaps the most striking aspect of WRFA 2003, and one that has
received little attention, however, lies in its understanding of religion
and its practice. In its imposition of heightened accommodation re-
quirements, the Act necessarily espouses one or both of the following
views of law and religion in the workplace: (1) religiously motivated
behavior, by its very nature, is involuntary and/or immutable and,
therefore, must be accommodated, 24 at least to a "significant" degree,
and/or (2) the ability to engage in religious activity is so important
that, volitional or not, it is a personal right that must be accommo-
22 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ").
23 See, e.g., GregoryJ. Gawlik, Note, The Politics of Religion: "Reasonable Accommoda-
tions" and the Establishment Clause: An Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249, 255-58 (1999) (discussing the test used for Establishment
Clause challenges); Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Exam-
ination of the Different Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and
the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745, 757 (1998) ("Anytime the government takes any affirmative
action in the name of religion, it is treading a thin line between what is permissible
and what is a violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause."); see also Es-
tate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (striking down a statute
requiring Sabbath accommodation, with Justice O'Connor stressing distinctions be-
tween "reasonable accommodation" under Title VII and the absolute accommodation
at issue). "Title VII attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by
private employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifically
contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 711-12 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
Although the Act's constitutionality is likely based on inferences from Thornton, given
the Court's implicit upholding of section 701 (j) in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63, 89-91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (albeit on a "de minimis"
level), and its approval of exemptions for religious employers under Title VII in Corpo-
ration of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987), it is not clear that the Act
would pass Establishment Clause scrutiny. Moreover, at least as applied to state and
local employers, constitutionality would be doubtful in light of the Court's holding in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), restricting federal interference with neu-
tral state or local laws affecting religion, and, as applied to nonfederal employers,
there is also a tenuous argument that "Congress cannot show that the failure to make
religious accommodations 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." See Roger
Clegg, Praying on the Job, LEGAL TIMES, June 9, 2003, at 58, 59. But see Richard T.
Foltin & James D. Standish, Your Job or Your Faith ?, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 36
(arguing that WRFA 2003 is constitutional).
24 See generally John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Value of Religious Liberty, 18
CONN. L. REv. 779, 798-801 (1986) (discussing what he calls both the "cognitive" and
"volitional" aspects of religious exercise that potentially render it something over
which "there is no question of a choice").
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dated.25 Regardless of which view is offered, both are flawed. The
first, which could be referred to as an "irresistible impulse" or "immu-
tability" theory, mandates a view of religion and religious practice that
is not only open to dispute, but that also unduly imposes the cost of its
debatable conclusion on others. The second, which could be called
the "personal rights" theory, ignores relevant state interests and the
fundamental distinction between state and private action for purposes
of religious freedom, and, again, imposes the cost on others.2 6 Re-
member, the question is not discrimination because of religious status
or belief per se, which might serve as a sensible basis for protection,
particularly given its often-perceived connection to race and/or na-
tional origin, as well as the lack of any demand for affirmative em-
ployer action.2 7  Rather, the issue is the legally mandated
accommodation by employers of employee actions purportedly moti-
vated by religious belief, including ones that might otherwise hinder
the performance of an employee's job or the employer's business, 28
such as "the handling of serpents."
In offering an "irresistible impulse" view of religious practice, the
Act would certainly be neither new nor alone. Indeed, one could ar-
gue that this view was central, intentionally or not, to the 1972 amend-
ment by its definition of "religion" as including "observance and
practice."29 Yet, the theory has been limited in practice by the Su-
preme Court's "de minimis" test.30 Thus, its proposed extension (or
re-affirmation) by the Act would expose religious action accommoda-
tion for what it is-a policy choice antithetical to the "prejudice"
model of discrimination law.3 1 Indeed, in equating religious action
25 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 604-05 (2000).
26 Even leaving overall constitutionality aside, in light of City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
530, the burdens on private employers under the Act might be even greater than
those of at least the state or local governmental employers otherwise covered. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); infra note 35.
27 Indeed, even the 1972 Amendment considers "belief" its own category. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j). As discussed in Part V.A below, the belief/status category is a
sound basis for employers, employees, and courts to balance job performance and
believer invasiveness on a proper antidiscrimination principle.
28 See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Work-
place Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1197, 1200 (2003) (noting that job perform-
ance is nondispositive in assessing accommodation).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
30 Indeed, some, like Justice Marshall, challenge the Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison holding as "a fatal blow" to Congress's effort to accommodate religion. See
432 U.S. 63, 86 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 Professor Christine Jolls has commented that, unlike "accommodation" provi-
sions, "[t] he canonical idea of 'antidiscrimination' in the United States condemns the
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with the categories otherwise protected by such laws (e.g., race, gen-
der, disability), and then imposing a further burden of affirmative ac-
tion up to "significant difficulty," the Act betrays, in one way or the
other, the very meaning of discrimination as it has been largely under-
stood in this context-different treatment of, or impact on, similarly
situated employees based on immutable factors unrelated to perform-
ance. 32 Act supporters might argue that religious activity is irresisti-
ble, involuntary, or immutable, but the lack (or potential
impossibility) of agreement on the matter makes highly suspect the
inclusion of such activity among the list of protected categories and,
even more, an imposition on others as a result.33 It should also be
noted that in adopting this approach to religion, the Act contradicts
the overwhelming emphasis on choice and neutrality in analogous
differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, or other protected characteristics." Christine Jolls, Antidis-
crimination and Accommodation, 115 l-uv. L. REV. 642, 643 (2001) (citing Robert Post,
Prijudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1,
9-12 (2000)).
32 The Court asserted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), that
"[w] hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." Id. at 431. In light of this, Pro-
fessor Karen Engle notes that by "requiring, at least in certain instances, that employ-
ees who claim the need for religious accommodation be treated differently from
other employees, Title VII's religious accommodation provision poses a challenge to
the liberal, or neutral, ideology embedded in the interpretation of the remainder of
the statute." Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accom-
modation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REv. 317, 320 (1997). Thus, "employ-
ees claiming to have been discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs
and practices actually receive more favorable treatment than other classes of employ-
ees protected by Title VII. .. ." Michael D. Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming the
Good News?: The Employer's Ambiguous Duty to Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) (emphasis added).
33 As the Fifth Circuit opined in Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980),
"[s]ave for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibi-
tion are those that are either beyond the victim's power to alter.., or that impose a
burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases." Id. at 269. Professor Steven
Jamar suggests further, "[d]iscrimination based on belief is different from that based
upon birthright because beliefs and concepts are a matter of choice." Steven D.
Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious
Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 727 (1996). Continuing, he argues that religious
discrimination is based not upon an unavoidable status which is an accident
of birth such as race, color, sex, or national origin, or the result of natural
processes such as aging or the result of disability whether congenital or the
result of some post-natal illness or trauma; it is based on choice ... [t] hat is,
people can choose what to believe and can change their beliefs.
Id. at 747.
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constitutional church-state jurisprudence and its corresponding with-
drawal from disparate impact theory in approving neutral, generally
applicable state action. 34 What is good enough for the state (at least
constitutionally) 35 should be good enough for employers.
Alternatively, to the extent the Act reflects a "personal rights" the-
ory (regardless of mutability or volition), this theory would both ig-
nore the role of relevant state interests and blur the difference
between state and private action for "religious freedom" purposes. It
is certainly true that other volitional acts, such as collective labor, jury
duty, military service, or whistleblowing, yield personal rights and pro-
tections under federal law, 36 but not only are these other acts rooted
34 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002) (approving
participation of religious schools in a state voucher program based, in large part, on
the fact that use of the vouchers was a matter of parental choice, not state action); see
also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (approving the denial of
unemployment benefits to an employee terminated for smoking peyote, despite his
religious motivations, based on the neutrality and general applicability of the relevant
law).
35 As an amendment to Title VII, WRFA 2003 would, as a statutory matter, apply
to covered governmental employers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-16 (2000).
Yet, constitutionally, its use of a heightened test for such employers is seemingly in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's preference for neutrality and nonendorsement.
Cf Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 116-18 (2001) (contrasting
neutrality and endorsement in approving mere access to a public facility). More spe-
cifically, as to state and local entities, constitutionality is in even greater doubt given
the holding in City of Boerne v. flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997), that Congress ex-
ceeded its powers in mandating exemptions to neutral state laws of general applica-
tion in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
Further, on the federal level, it should be noted that WRFA 2003 would go even fur-
ther than RFRA, whose "compelling interest" test for federal acts that "substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of gen-
eral applicability" most likely does not apply to federal job rules. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1; see Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace: Title
VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2526 (1996) (citing S.
REP. No. 103-111, at 13 (1993), for the notion that RFRA shall not "be construed as
affecting religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
Although the White House Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the
Federal Workplace increased accommodation in a manner similar to the Act for some
federal workers, these are a mere "policy statement" with no independent force of
law. WOLF ET AL., supra note 8, at 8 (citing Press Release, White House Office of the
Press Secretary, Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the
Federal Workplace app. H (Aug 14, 1997), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/
textonly/WH/New/html/19970819-3275.html).
36 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (2000) (for collective
labor action); Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311-4319 (2000) (for military service); Jury Systems Im-
provement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000) (for jury duty). For an example of Title VII
[VOL. 79:31030
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in stronger links to greater state interests,3 7 they also do not generally
mandate the same degree of accommodation required by the Act.38
With mandatory accommodation, religious freedom is not really free,
but rather is charged to the accommodator. In fact, in requiring such
a high level of accommodation at present, the Act would impose an
even greater burden on employers already struggling in an uncertain
economy, a struggle that naturally (and directly) impacts labor
generally. 39
Furthermore, the "personal rights" theory would also unduly in-
sulate religion from the dialogue between individual choices and the
marketplace of ideas-a traditional hallmark of religious liberty. 40 In
light of this tradition, Senator Jennings Randolph was in error when
he stated in offering the 1972 Amendment that "it carries through the
spirit of religious freedom under the Constitution of the United
States."41 Indeed, that "spirit" did not take hold in employment in any
significant way until Title VII itself, and until 1972 it never carried
with it any prevailing notion of accommodation. 42 The "spirit of relig-
retaliation protections for whistleblowing, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, and see also JAMES
0. CASTAGNERA ET AL., TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 10,301-10,307 (2002) (dis-
cussing bans on termination resulting from employees' actions).
37 As described in Part V.B, these interests include, for jury duty, the "mainte-
nance and independence of the judicial system," CASTAGNERA ET AL., supra note 36,
10,302 (quoting Lucas v. Matlack, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. W. Va. 1993)),
and for collective labor action, the "industrial peace." NLRB v. Americare-New Lex-
ington Health Care Ctr., 124 F.3d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1997).
38 As described in Part V.B, of the provisions addressed, only USERRA requires
accommodation on a level similar to that proposed by WRFA 2003. See 38 U.S.C.
§ 4312(d)(1) (detailing the exceptions for reemployment).
39 See Gretchen Morgenson, War Rally Loses Sight of Deeper Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2003, § 3, at 1 (discussing the modern economy in light of relevant global conflicts
and recessionary trends, and noting that notwithstanding the expected "emotional
rally" from the war with Iraq, "corporate spending remains moribund, consumers are
nervous, and layoffs keep coming").
40 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1995).
41 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972). Indeed, in his remarks, Senator Randolph stated
even further that "I think this is an appropriate time for the Senate, and hopefully the
Congress of the United States, to go back, as it were, to what the Founding Fathers
intended." Id. Perhaps more pertinently, Senator Randolph's approach is echoed by
Senator Santorum in his assertion, in introducing WRFA 2003, that the bill involves
the "first freedom," that is, "freedom to exercise one's religion according to the dic-
tates of ... religious conscience." 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Santorum).
42 See Russell S. Post, The Serpentine Wall and the Serpent's Tongue: Rethinking the
Religious Harassment Debate, 83 VA. L. REv. 177, 180-81 (1977) (noting that the scant
legislative history behind Title VII "suggests that religion was included in Title VII as
2004] 1031
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ious freedom" is undoubtedly central to the constitutional system, but
that concerns state, not private, action. 43 Finally, to suspend religion
from debate, discourse, or even difficulty, in the manner proposed by
the Act is not authentic freedom, but an atrophic enabling that is
harmful not only to legal and market systems, but also to the vitality of
religion itself.44
Neither the foregoing nor the remainder of this Article is in-
tended to suggest that there is no role for voluntary accommodation
by employers of the religious practices of their employees, nor is there
any intention to pass judgment on any particular beliefs or practices.
To the contrary, voluntary action is to be encouraged of any employer
interested in an efficient and content workforce, particularly given the
current religious climate in America, and may, depending on one's
particular perspective, even be a moral imperative. 45 Even Act spon-
boi lerplate language to ensure uniformity of the anti-discrimination principle, not as
a function of any compelling policy rationale").
43 Leaving federal employers aside, it is generally accepted that the constitutional
source of power for the regulation of religious practices at work is the Commerce
Clause, not the First or Fourteenth Amendments. As the Court stated in United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979): "Title VII .. . was enacted pursuant to the com-
merce power to regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to
incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." Id. at 206 n.6. Thus, given the lack of state action, there is no additional
source of power from the First Amendment, either independently or via the Four-
teenth. Indeed, both the First and Fourteenth, by their very language, generally sin-
gle out state, not private, action as their target. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law.... ."); id. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... ."); see also Endres v. Ind.
State Police, 334 F.3d 618, 630 (7th Cir. 2003) ("This means that § 701 (j) [of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964] rests on the commerce clause alone... [and] may not be used to
compel a State to defend in federal court a private suit seeking accommodation of a
religious practice."); Harry T. Edwards & Joel H. Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and
the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 603 (1971) (confirming that
both amendments "protect the individual's religious freedom against infringement
only by governmental, not private, action" and that "the reference to religious dis-
crimination in Title VII plainly was not intended to be a restatement of the substan-
tive constitutional right; rather, the Civil Rights Act is grounded in Congress'
regulatory power under the commerce clause of the Constitution"). Finally, Senator
Kerry, in his comments introducing WRFA 2003 itself, expressly states that the Act
does not "substantively expand 14th Amendment rights." 149 CONG. Rrc. S5353
(daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
44 Cf GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1459 (2d ed. 1991) (dis-
cussing limitations on government interference in religious affairs and "competition
among sects" as an influential notion in the constitutional context) (citing LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-60 (2d ed. 1988)).
45 Cf Marianne C. DelPo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom in the New
Millenium, 51 ME. L. REv. 341, 342 (1999) (discussing the sensitivity of employers);
Clegg, supra note 23, at 58-59 (discussing the economic incentive role).
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sor Senator Santorum admitted that "most private employers" volunta-
rily accommodate their employees' religious practices, and that "[i] n
this land of religious freedom, one would hope that employers would
spontaneously accommodate the religious needs of their employees
whenever reasonable." 46 Senator Randolph shared these sentiments
in 1972, when he noted that the need for mandating accommodation
would only arise "in perhaps a very, very small percentage of cases,"
given "that usually the persons on both sides of this situation, the em-
ployer and the employee, are of an understanding frame of mind and
heart."47 Whether it is the wearing of ashes, observing the Sabbath, or
snake handling, employers who, in their judgment, wish to accommo-
date should certainly be encouraged and free to do so. 48 The ques-
tion is the role of the state and the answer, as it is in the constitutional
arena, should be equal and neutral treatment.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
A. Origins
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as originally enacted,
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 49
46 149 CONG. REC. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
47 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972).
48 Even absent any accommodation mandate, to the extent that employers base
refusals to accommodate a religious practice purely on the religious status of the ac-
tion to be performed, they would still be liable under the nondiscrimination (i.e.,
"disparate treatment") provisions of Title VII generally. See Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977) (discussing discriminatory purpose and discrimi-
natory consequences). Indeed, this was the approach of most courts prior to section
701 (j)'s amendment. As Professor Engle points out, the approach at that time was:
An employer may not refuse to employ or discharge any person because of
his religious beliefs, but surely the great and diversified types of American
business cannot be expected to accede to the wishes of every doctrine or
religious belief .... [d] iscrimination against individuals on the basis of relig-
ion would therefore only mean making employment decisions based on re-
ligious beliefs.
Engle, supra note 32, at 365-66 (citations and quotations omitted); see alsoJolls, supra
note 31, at 648-49 (discussing the discrimination/accommodation distinction).
49 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
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There is little question that the primary goal of the 1964 Act was
the proscription of race discrimination. 50 However, in an effort to
cover other forms of "status" prejudice, it was expanded to cover such
other clearly immutable characteristics as sex, color, and national ori-
gin.5 1 More importantly for our purposes, it also provided protection
for religion. Interestingly enough, though, there is little in the way of
legislative history to determine whether Congress considered religion
an immutable characteristic, 52 whether it was singled out for protec-
tion based on its historical importance in the constitutional context,
53
or for some other reason. In fact, according to some scholars, Con-
gress included religion among the prohibited forms of discrimination
"without bothering seriously to consider or to document the prob-
lem.''5 4 In any event, religion's inclusion enshrined it as something
beyond the reach of employers in making relevant workplace deci-
sions and, in so doing, equated it with other indisputably immutable
characteristics, such as race or sex, at least for the purpose of legal
protection.55
50 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2516 (reporting comments by Rep. McColluch and others that Title VII's "pri-
mary task is to make certain that the channels of employment are open to persons
regardless of their race and that jobs in companies or membership in unions are
strictly filled on the basis of qualification"); see also id. pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2393 (stating that the "[m]ost glaring [discrimination], however, is
the discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout the Nation").
51 The Fifth Circuit noted in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), that
[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured only when employers are
barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable
characteristics, such as race and national origin. Similarly, an employer can-
not have one hiring policy for men and another for women if the distinction
is based on some fundamental right.
Id. at 1091; see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting the
unique protection afforded to religion in employment as a mutable characteristic).
52 SeeJamar, supra note 33, at 741 ("Although the legislative history is not helpful
on this point, it is probable that religion was originally seen as a status, like race or
sex, and the problem of discrimination based upon belief or religious needs was not
well thought through.").
53 See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 600-02 (citing constitutional "religious
freedom" motivations).
54 Id. at 600; see also Post, supra note 42, at 180-81 (noting that legislative history
is "deeply ambiguous" and its "pervasive silence suggests" no "compelling policy
rationale").
55 Lawrence Lorber, an employment lawyer with the firm of Proskauer Rose, LLP,
recently summarized the rather conclusory approach to the original inclusion of "re-
ligion" in Title VII as follows: "[W] hen Title VII was passed, the religious discrimina-
tion provision was not a very exceptional provision .... [t] he notion was that certainly
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The mere religious beliefs (or status) of an individual may very
well serve as a sensible boundary for a prejudice-targeted discrimina-
tion law, particularly given its common connection with race or na-
tional origin and the seemingly appropriate reluctance of the law to
question the mere beliefs of a person. 56 The 1964 Act was amended
in 1972, however, to go beyond status and into action-largely in an
effort to rescue by legislation relevant interpretive regulations issued
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Title
VII's enforcement agency, that tried in both 1966 and 1967, in varying
degrees and with mixed results, to do just that.5 7 The 1972 amend-
ment altered the scope of the 1964 Act by expanding its protection of
"religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the con-
duct of the employer's business." 58
Thus, whether the original protection of religious status was
rooted in an "irresistible impulse" or a personal rights theory, its ex-
pansion into religious practice carried, rather significantly, either one
(or both) of these theories outside the boundary of prejudicial treat-
ment and into the arena of special consideration and mandatory af-
firmative action.59
Again, according to the chief sponsor of the 1972 amendment,
Senator Randolph, religion should encompass "the same concepts as
are included in the first amendment-not merely belief, but also con-
duct; the freedom to believe, and also the freedom to act."60 Senator
Randolph's statement, however, not only misses the critical distinction
between state and private action, it also ignores the fact that religion
in our diverse country, people should not be denied employment because of their
religion." Lawrence Lorber, Reconciling Obligations: Accommodating Religious
Practice on the Job, Comments at the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Confer-
ence (May 21, 2002) (transcript on file with author). However, as Lorber pointed
out, "the issue then became . .. what do you do." Id.
56 See WotF ET AL., supra note 8, at 33 ("As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated, it is improper for the courts to decide 'whether a particular practice is or is
not required by the tenets of [a] religion."') (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d
897, 900 (7th Cir. 1978)). '"
57 See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting the
confirmation effect of the 1972 amendments of section 701(j) to the 1966 and 1967
EEOC guidelines, and holding that the nondiscrimination duty of an employer in-
cludes an obligation "to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of employees").
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
59 See Moberly, supra note 32, at 3.
60 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972).
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under the 1972 amendment, by including accommodation require-
ments, is not the same "concept" as religion under the First Amend-
ment.6 1 As the Seventh Circuit recently opined in this context,
"[1]ogic does not furnish what history lacks."62 This discrepancy is
made even more apparent by the Supreme Court's refusal to expand
affirmative accommodation under the First Amendment in light of
neutral, generally applicable laws, 63 and, indeed, in the Act's own pro-
posal of an unprecedented increase of accommodation under Title
VII itself.64
In defining religious practices under section 701(j), the EEOC
published the following interpretative guidance in 1980:
[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include moral
or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely
held with the strength of traditional religious views .... The fact
that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact the relig-
ious group to which the individual professes to belong may not ac-
cept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious
belief of the employee or prospective employee. The phrase "relig-
ious practice" as used in these Guidelines includes both religious
observances and practices .... 65
Turning to the religious practice arena, the EEOC went even fur-
ther in 1989 in asserting that "[o]nly the individual can determine
whether his absence from work is required in order to attend a relig-
61 Although section 701(j) of Title VII and WRFA 2003 might otherwise be con-
stitutional, their principle of accommodation of religious practices (as opposed to
other types of practices), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4)
(2003), is at least theoretically distinct from the Supreme Court's emphasis on state
neutrality in the constitutional arena. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (construing the Establishment Clause); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (construing the Free Exercise Clause); see also
Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334 F.3d 618, 630 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that Title VII's
"accommodation requirement does not reinforce the constitutional approach; to the
contrary, neutrality (which is both necessary to avoid disparate treatment and, under
Smith, sufficient to avoid any violation) differs substantially from accommodation [in
that n]eutrality is blind to religion" and that "accommodation requires consciousness
of religion and entails a demand that believers and non-believers receive different
treatment").
62 Endres, 334 F.3d at 360.
63 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10
(1986) (upholding the U.S. Air Force's application of a neutral ban on the wearing of
"headgear" indoors to prohibit the wearing of a yarmulke by an Orthodox Jewish
officer).
64 See S. 893 § 2.
65 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2003).
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ious observance. ' 66 Thus, not only are the practices isolated for pro-
tection and accommodation, but also the inquiry into their motivation
and validity is expanded beyond traditional notions of religion to
moral and ethical practices. Although this expansion has been lim-
ited somewhat by the courts, the position taken by the EEOC is ex-
tremely influential, particularly with a cautious employer.
Furthermore, the fact that courts are generally reluctant to put plain-
tiffs to the test over the "religious" nature of their beliefs67 renders the
EEOC's position all the more significant.
B. Back to the Future: Section 701(j)
Again, Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, only prohibited
discrimination "because of ... religion," without any reference to em-
ployer accommodation, reasonable or otherwise. 68 As the Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded in its 1970 decision of Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,69 a
case that was shortly thereafter affirmed by an equally divided U.S.
Supreme Court,
[t] he legislative history of the Act expresses a clear Congressional
intent to inhibit only discrimination against an individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The plain lan-
guage of the statute, Section 2000e-2(a) of Title 42, is susceptible of
no other meaning. Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do
we find any Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to
accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another.
70
As described above, the EEOC published "Religious Discrimina-
tion Guidelines" in 1966 and 1967, the latter of the two stating that
"the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds" under Title VII
requires the employer to "make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such
accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the con-
66 WOLF ET AL., supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Cardona v. Frank, Nos. 01882012,
01882013, 1989 WL 1003917, at *3 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 11, 1989)).
67 See id. at 29.
68 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
69 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afJ'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam) (uphold-
ing the termination of an employee for his refusal to find a replacement for work on
his Sabbath). The language conceming accommodation is effectively dicta given the
fact that the court held that even if "reasonable accommodation" were required, the
employer had provided it. See id. at 331.
70 Id. at 334.
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duct of the employer's business." 71 These guidelines, though not in
effect during the actions in Dewey, were nevertheless undercut by its
overarching theme, namely that antidiscrimination principles do not
necessarily yield accommodation duties. 72 Indeed, it was this theme
from Dewey that prompted Congress, by means of the section 701 (j)
amendment, to attempt to "resolve by legislation" this dichotomy. 73
The pre-1972 jurisprudence is also reflected in the federal district
court decision of Riley v. Bendix Corp., 4 where the court confronted a
religious discrimination claim by a Seventh-Day Adventist arising out
of his termination for refusing to work during his Sabbath hours. Al-
though later reversed by the Fifth Circuit in light of the subsequent
amendment of Title VII through section 701 (j),75 the district court in
Riley held that the nondiscrimination provisions of the 1964 Act did
not require an employer to accommodate affirmatively the religious
practices of employees, notwithstanding the intervening EEOC guide-
lines.76 In rejecting the EEOC's guidelines, the district court stated
that "it would be unreasonable and impractical to require the com-
plex American business structure to prove why it cannot gear itself to
the 'varied religious practices of the American people."' 77 Instead,
71 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) (effective July 10, 1967). The earlier version of the
guideline, which imposed an arguably lighter burden (i.e., a duty "to accommodate to
the reasonable religious needs of employees ... where such accommodation can be
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business") (emphasis added),
was effective June 15, 1966, and was essentially replaced by this 1967 guideline. Id.
72 Although Professor Jolls's questioning of the degree to which accommodation
is not already subsumed in the actual effect of antidiscrimination laws as envisioned
by Title VII as a whole is well taken, the distinction in the religion area is made clear
by the efforts of Congress to amend the statute in 1972, and potentially again through
WRFA 2003, to address this very point. SeeJolls, supra note 31, at 645.
73 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972). As Professor Engle notes:
Indeed, Congress chose to amend Title VII only after the Supreme Court
affirmed-by an equally divided court and without opinion-a circuit
court's opinion suggesting that Title VII's proscription of discrimination
based on religion meant that employers could not discriminate on the basis
of religious status or belief but could discriminate on the basis of religious
observance.
Engle, supra note 32, at 362 (emphasis added).
74 330 F. Supp. 583, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
75 See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972).
76 See Riley, 330 F. Supp. at 588-90.
77 Id. at 588-89 (quoting the 1967 EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(d)
(1968)). The nonaccommodation approach of the Court in Riey seems to be sup-
ported by the legislative history of the 1964 Act in that "the discussion of religious
discrimination [in the Congressional debates over the 1964 Act] was not broadened
to include problems such as work assignments that conflict with religious holidays."
Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 602 n.10.
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the court took a neutrality approach wherein "[a] n employer may not
refuse to employ or discharge any person because of his religious be-
liefs, but surely the great and diversified types of American business
cannot be expected to accede to the wishes of every doctrine or relig-
ious belief. 7 8 Thus, the court, while affirming the principle of neu-
tral treatment of belief, refused to interpret such a principle to
include the affirmative accommodation of religious practice.
In response to the approach taken by decisions such as those of
the Sixth Circuit in Dewey and the district court in Riley, Senator Ran-
dolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist from West Virginia, 79 introduced the
proposed amendment of section 701(j) as follows:
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the
same rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in
Federal, State or local governments. Unfortunately, the courts
have, in a sense, come down on both sides of the issue. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in a case involving the obser-
vance of the Sabbath and job discrimination [i.e., Dewey], divided
evenly on the question.
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by
legislation-and in a way I think was originally intended by the Civil
Rights Act-that which the courts apparently have not resolved. I
think it is needed not only because court decisions have clouded
the matter with some uncertainty; I think this is an appropriate time
for the Senate, and hopefully the Congress of the United States, to
go back, as it were, to what the Founding Fathers intended. The
complexity of our industrial life, the transition of our whole area of
employment, of course are matters that were not always understood
by those who led our Nation in earlier days.80
The amendment passed unanimously in the Senate, with "similar ap-
proval" in the House.8 1
78 Riley, 330 F. Supp. at 590.
79 See 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972) (discussing Senator Randolph's religious affilia-
tion). As Professor Stephen Carter has noted, "religious organizations were among
the strongest supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimina-
tion in employment and public accommodations." STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE
OF DISBELIEF 228 (1993). Similarly, as Gregory Baxter has observed of an earlier ver-
sion of WRFA 2003, it is "primarily religious groups [who] support the WRFA" as well.
Gregory M. Baxter, Note, Employers Beware: The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2000,
2 RuTGERsJ.L. & RELIGION 6 3-4 (2000); see also 149 CONG. REc. S5352-53 (daily
ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (listing various religious groups in
support of WRFA 2003). The narrative in this footnote is provided more as a point of
information than to draw any particular conclusion.
80 118 CONG. Rc. 705-06 (1972).
81 Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Although the congressional support for section 701(j) is beyond
doubt, the scant record of legislative history on the amendment
yielded significant uncertainty as to its exact meaning, a fate seem-
ingly shared by the inclusion of religion in the 1964 Act in the first
place. As the Supreme Court noted five years after the amendment of
section 701 (j) in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, Senator Ran-
dolph, whose views form the bulk of the otherwise limited congres-
sional record on the amendment of section 701(j), "expressed his
general desire 'to assure that freedom from religious discrimination
in the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by law' ...
but he made no attempt to define the precise circumstances under
which the 'reasonable accommodation' requirement would be ap-
plied."8 2 The Court commented further that the EEOC had similarly
failed, through its 1967 guidelines effectively ratified by Congress in
its amendment of section 701(j), to define the specific parameters of
this duty.8 3 The Court stated, "the employer's statutory obligation to
make reasonable accommodation for the religious observances of its
employees, short of incurring an undue hardship, is clear, but the
reach of that obligation has never been spelled out by Congress or by
EEOC guidelines. '8 4
Lacking a statutory definition, the lower courts struggled.8 5 For
example, in the 1975 case of Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 86 the Sixth
Circuit held that lowered employee morale and discontent did not
create an "undue hardship" in accommodating a Sabbath observance
by forced shift substitution. In so ruling, the court cited the EEOC,
stating that such discontent might pose an "undue hardship" if the
employer can show it would "produce 'chaotic personnel
problems.'- 8 7 On the other hand, in the 1974 case of Johnson v. U.S.
Postal Service,88 the Fifth Circuit held that a forced shift substitution of
a postal clerk would, in fact, create an "undue hardship" under the
1967 EEOC guidelines (that were later affirmed by section 701(j)).
The court concluded that "[t]o accept [the employee's] demands
82 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972)).
83 See id. at 75 n.9.
84 Id. at 75.
85 As the Court observed in Hardison, "[c] ases decided by the Courts of Appeals
since the enactment of the 1972 amendments to Title VII ... provide us with little
guidance as to the scope of the employer's obligation." Id. at 75 n.10.
86 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975).
87 Id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 72-0606 (Dec. 22, 1971), CCH EEOC Dec.
6310, at 4555 (1972); EEOC Decision No. 71463 (Nov. 13, 1970), CCH EEOC Dec.
6206, at 4350 (1972)); accord Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521
(6th Cir. 1975) (citing the same EEOC cases).
88 497 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
[VOL- 79:31040
PERILS OF UNIVERSAL ACCOMMODATION
would result in an undue hardship on the effective operation of the
* . . post office. The Post Master clearly needed a person in [the em-
ployee's] position who was truly a flexible employee, available when-
ever needed."89 Thus, the jurisprudence immediately following the
adoption of section 701 (j) seemed prime for clarification-and then
along came Larry Hardison.
C. Charting Messina: Hardison and Philbrook
Larry Hardison was a supply clerk for Trans World Airlines
(TWA) at its Kansas City, Missouri maintenance facility.90 Though evi-
dently not particularly religious at the time of his hiring, Hardison
converted to the Worldwide Church of God one year later.91 One of
the "tenets of the religion" of this church is a Saturday Sabbath (from
sundown Friday to sundown Saturday) for which TWA was not willing
to accommodate by imposing an involuntary shift change, given that
this accommodation would have, in turn, violated a certain seniority
provision of the collective bargaining agreement.92 Although TWA
was willing to assist in a voluntary shift swap, explore other jobs within
the company, and seek union acquiescence to a seniority exception, it
was unwilling to violate the collective bargaining agreement. 93 Upon
the union's refusal to acquiesce, the end result was Hardison's termi-
nation for failure to report to work during his Sabbath.94
The district court ruled in favor of the employer (and the union),
holding that it "satisfied its 'reasonable accommodations' obligation,
and any further accommodation would have worked an undue hard-
ship on the company." 95 In affirming this lower court ruling, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "[tlo require TWA to bear more than a de
minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hard-
ship."96 Among the anticipated "costs" the Court cited were breach of
the seniority system and/or the payment of premium wages to a Satur-
day replacement. 97 Moreover, any such alterations to TWA's then cur-
rent system would necessarily result in different (i.e., discriminatory)
89 Id.
90 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66.
91 See id. at 67.
92 Id. at 68.
93 Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 888-89 (W.D. Mo.
1974).
94 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 69.
95 Id. at 70; see also Hardison, 375 F. Supp. at 891 (discussing TWA's choices for
further accommodation).
96 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (citation omitted).
97 Id.
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treatment of nonreligiously motivated shift and/or job preferences. 98
In reference to this inevitable consequence, the Court stated that
"[fi] n the absence of clear statutory language or legislative history to
the contrary, we will not readily construe the statute to require an
employer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable
others to observe their Sabbath."99
Having established the "de minimis" parameters of the "undue
hardship" limit in the 1977 Hardison case, the Court then proceeded
to delineate the "reasonableness" of the employer's accommodation
duty in its 1986 decision in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.10 0
That case concerned an employee's (Ronald Philbrook) request for
paid leave for certain Worldwide Church of God Sabbath observances
that were beyond what was otherwise provided in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.1 01 The contract provided paid leave for a list of
specified purposes, including three days for "mandated religious ob-
servance."' 0 2 The agreement also offered three more days of paid
leave for "necessary personal business," which Philbrook's employer
interpreted as "necessary and essential" to "family or personal life,"
but which, under the contract, could not include any reasons other-
wise listed therein-e.g., a "mandated religious observance." a0 3 Thus,
upon his exhaustion of three observance days, Philbrook could only
take unpaid leave for any further days taken for such purposes, some-
thing his employer permitted him to do.'0 4 Philbrook sought a modi-
fication to the restriction on "necessary personal business" paid leave
or, in the alternative, paid leave reduced by the cost of a relevant sub-
stitute, but his employer rejected both of these proposals. 05
Although the Supreme Court in Philbrook remanded the case to
ensure that the employer had interpreted "necessary personal busi-
ness" in a consistent manner that did not discriminate against such
business if religious in nature (though not a "mandatory obser-
vance")-and the lower courts so found106 -it otherwise upheld the
employer's actions.' 0 7 In so doing, the Court held that the policy "re-
quiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that
98 Id. at 84-85.
99 Id. at 85.
100 479 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1986).
101 See id. at 62-65.
102 Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1991).
103 Id. at 52.
104 Id. at 50.
105 See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 64-65.
106 See Philbrook, 925 F.2d at 54.
107 See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69-71.
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exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement,
would generally be a reasonable one."' 0 8 The Court rejected the
holding of the Second Circuit and similar EEOC guidance that if mul-
tiple "reasonable" (i.e., conflict-resolving) accommodations exist, the
employee's preference governs, subject to the "undue burden"
limit. 10 9 Instead, the Court stated that "an employer has met its obli-
gations under [section] 701 (j) when it demonstrates that it has of-
fered a reasonable accommodation,"'"1 and "[t]o the extent that the
[EEOC] guideline, like the approach of the court of appeals, requires
the employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short
of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the statute.""'
In the lower courts, reaction to Hardison and Philbrook has been
mixed, although certain themes may be gleaned from the cases. From
Hardison and Philbrook, employers are given a rather clear, albeit lim-
ited, mandate-you must resolve all conflicts between an employee's
religious practice and your policies unless doing so would pose more
than a "de minimis" cost. Thus, a "reasonable" accommodation is one
that "eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and
religious practices." 112 Examples may include voluntary shift swaps,
unpaid leave (if any paid leave denials are otherwise nondiscrimina-
tory), job transfers, or grooming exemptions, but would not include
partial changes to any of the foregoing that fail to resolve the con-
flict(s).'1 3 And, an "undue hardship" is any accommodation, whether
reasonable or not, that would cost the employer something beyond
108 Id. at 70.
109 See id. at 67-70. For the relevant EEOC guidelines, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(c) (2) (ii) (1986).
110 Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69.
111 Id. at69n.6.
112 Id. at 70.
113 See, e.g., id. at 70 (unpaid leave); Cosine v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 159 (2d
Cir. 2002) (job transfer); Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriffs Dep't, 29 F.3d 589,
593 (11th Cir. 1994) (voluntary shift swaps); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d
1375, 1379 (6th Cir. 1994) (partial changes that fail to resolve the conflict are not
"reasonable"); Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (E.D. Ark. 1993)
(grooming rule exceptions); see also LEX LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§§ 56.03[2], 56.12 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing "reasonable accommodation," specifi-
cally in connection with collective bargaining agreements, and general constitutional
objections to the "reasonable accommodation" clause); Kaminer, supra note 19, at
604-10 (examining what it means to resolve the conflict, including what costs the
employer may place on an employee requesting accommodation).
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inconvenience.1 14 In this, "a determination of undue hardship is not
so much the result of a balancing of the interests of the employee who
seeks accommodation against the employer as it is a finding that ac-
commodation of the employee will impose some nontrivial cost upon
the employer or upon other employees." 115 Examples may include
efficiency losses, economic costs, health and safety, or breaches to an
otherwise valid seniority provision, but would not include employer
distaste, coworker grumbling or dissatisfaction alone, or pure specula-
tion on potential liability or market risks.'1 6 The courts are somewhat
split on the issue of coworker complaints, morale, and burdens, al-
though the general consensus seems to be that the resolution of such
issues should focus on the objective, rather than subjective, impact on
the work lives and job functions of fellow employees. 117
Political and scholarly reaction to Hardison and Philbrook in the
years following their pronouncements of "de minimis"'1 8 hardship
and employer choice has been mixed as well, although the "nays" have
naturally taken prominence in countering the status quo. On the po-
litical side, reaction by the EEOC to Hardison, although "aggressive"' 19
in both tone and in proposing the consideration of "the size and oper-
ating cost of the employer"'120 and the "number of individuals"'121 af-
114 See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1976) (holding that
TWA's payment of premium wages to get a weekend substitute was an undue
hardship).
115 Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, What Constitutes Employer's Reasonable Accom-
modation of Employee's Religious Preferences Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 134
A.L.R. FED. 1, 25 (2003).
116 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (economic costs); Virts v. Consol. Freightways
Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2002) (collectively bargained seniority); EEOC
v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1998) (employer or
coworker distastes); Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (specula-
tive hardships); Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993) (efficiency losses);
Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (health and
safety); see also Kaminer, supra note 19, at 610-22 (citing cases); EEOC, supra note 18,
at 3 ("Claiming that your coworkers might be 'upset' or 'uncomfortable' when they
see your turban is not an undue hardship.").
117 See, e.g., Bruffv. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001)
(requiring coworkers to assume higher workload was an undue burden); Weber v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a dispro-
portionate workload of coworkers is an undue burden); Townley Eng'g & Mfg., 859
F.2d at 615 (holding that an actual imposition or disruption is required); Chalmers v.
Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that inevitable coworker
harassment is an undue burden); see also Kaminer, supra note 19, at 617-21 (citing
cases).
118 Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 67 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).
119 Gawlik, supra note 23, at 254.
120 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1998), quoted in Gawlik, supra note 23, at 254.
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fected in calculating "undue hardship"' 22 (a notion reflected in WRFA
2003), as well as in requiring the adoption of the "alternative which
least disadvantages the individual,"' 2 3 (a concept expressly rejected by
Philbrook124 ) has generally "held the line,"125 leaving more aggressive
measures to Congress. 126 And, as noted above, members of Congress
have been introducing various versions of WRFA 2003 since 1994.127
Of course, the fact that no such measures have yet passed reflects, at
the very least, some congressional support for the Court's approach.
On the academic side, the comments, largely negative, have ranged
from assertions that "the Supreme Court has clearly failed to fulfill the
intent of Congress" 12 8 and that it has made Title VII "largely meaning-
less as a source of protection for the religiously observant employee of
the secular employer,"1 2 9 to tepid support, including statements that
the Hardison-Philbrook duo merely "balance [s] the policies of Title VII
and federal labor law'"1 0 and that, in rejecting impositions of burdens
on others, particularly coworkers, Hardison recognized that "religious
discrimination cuts both ways equally."' 31
Despite disagreement in Congress, the courts, and the academy
over the ultimate question of accommodation and its proper scope,
however, the Hardison and Philbrook interpretative gloss on section
701(j) remains the law of the land. WRFA 2003, of course, would
largely change that and, in so doing, would significantly alter both the
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 67-69.
125 Gawlik, supra note 23, at 254.
126 Id. Interestingly, in a move that could be seen as somewhat of an accommoda-
tion counterpoint, the EEOC also adopted in 1993, and shortly thereafter withdrew,
administrative guidelines applying Title VII hostile environment standards to relig-
ious speech in the workplace. See Post, supra note 42, at 177.
127 See Gawlik, supra note 23, at 250 n.5 (citing earlier versions of both House and
Senate bills). As Senator Santorum characterized Hardison and its progeny, "our Fed-
eral courts have essentially read ['reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship']
out of the law. .. ." 149 CONG. REc. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Santorum).
128 Rosenzweig, supra note 35, at 2518 n.31 (quoting CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 9.3.3, at 391 (2d ed. 1988)).
129 David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's
Proposed Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REV. 119, 127 (1995).
130 Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Employee Relig-
ious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT.
L. REv. 513, 573 (1989).
131 LARSON, supra note 113, §§ 56.03[1], 56.10.
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legal and theoretical understandings of religion and its practice in the
workplace.
III. WRFA 2003 AND THE DISABILITY MODEL
By both its preliminary legislative history and by its very text,
WRFA 2003 is unmistakably designed to track the accommodation ap-
proach of the ADA. 13 2 With this in mind, let us first turn to the latter
statute. The ADA, which was preceded by the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, a disability protection law largely restricted to those receiving
federal funds, 13 3 was enacted in response to what Congress saw as un-
just and improper barriers to employment and public services for "dis-
abled" Americans, which it then estimated at forty-three million
persons. 13 4 In its legislative findings at the beginning of the statute,
Congress declared, among other things, that:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position
of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability
of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.'
3 5
In those same findings, Congress also asserted that "census data,
national polls, and other studies have documented that people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and
are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and ed-
ucationally."'136 Moreover, Congress found that this "costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and nonproductivity."'13 7
The heart of the ADA's employment provisions bans discrimina-
tion by a covered employer "against a qualified individual with a disa-
bility because of the disability of such individual." 13 8 It defines
"qualified individual with a disability" as one "with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
132 See 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
Compare S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2003), with 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10) (2000)
(defining "undue burden" in almost identical terms).
133 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (2000).
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101.
135 Id. § 12,101 (a) (7).
136 Id. § 12,101 (a) (6).
137 Id. § 12,101 (a) (9).
138 Id. § 12,112(a).
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desires," 139 and includes among its prohibited forms of discrimination
the failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physi-
cal or mental limitations [of a protected individual] . . .unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business .. .. *"140 The
statute provides further that "reasonable accommodation" may in-
clude 'Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of ex-
aminations, training materials or policies, [and] the provision of qual-
ified readers or interpreters."' 141  It defines "undue hardship"
generally as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" 142
and offers a list of factors to consider in assessing the degree of such
hardships, including (1) the "nature and cost of the accommoda-
tion";14 3 (2) the "overall financial resources" 144 of the business; (3)
the "overall size"1 45 of the business, including "number, type, and lo-
cation" 146 of facilities; and finally, (4) the type of operation, including
"composition, structure, and functions of [its] workforce." 147 In its
enforcement and management of the ADA, the EEOC has also pro-
vided substantial guidance for over a decade to covered employers
and employees on "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship" beyond that which is otherwise provided in the statute.1 48
In elucidating "reasonable accommodation"'' 49 in the context of
job performance under the ADA, the EEOC, citing the 2002 decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,15 0 has pro-
vided the following summary guidance:
A modification or adjustment is "reasonable" if it "seems reasonable
on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases;" this means it is
"reasonable" if it appears to be "feasible" or "plausible." An accom-
139 Id. § 12,111(8).
140 Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
141 Id, § 12,111(9)(B).
142 Id. § 12,111(10) (A).
143 Id. § 12,111(10) (B) (i).
144 Id. § 12,111(10) (B) (ii).
145 Id. § 12,111(10) (B) (iii).
146 Id.
147 Id. § 12,111(10) (B) (iv).
148 See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 6908A, at 5467-6, 5467-28-31 (2003).
This guidance supplements the regulations it propounded upon the enactment of the
ADA, which are found at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2003), with accompanying appendix at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.1 app.
149 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9).
150 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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modation also must be effective in meeting the needs of the individ-
ual. In the context of job performance, this means that a
reasonable accommodation enables the individual to perform the
essential functions of the position.
1 5 1
In Barnett, the issue involved changes to a neutral seniority sys-
tem, which the Court held "would not be reasonable in the run of
cases."'15 2 Though such notions of reasonableness appear to intro-
duce concepts of hardship, the Court expressly rejected this inference
by distinguishing "reasonableness" as something that an employee
must show according to the "ordinarily or in the run of cases"'15 3 stan-
dard, and "undue hardship" as something that an employer must
demonstrate "in the particular circumstances."' 54 Moreover, the
EEOC does, in fact, give additional guidance on "undue hardship,"' 55
thus further clarifying that these are independent, yet intertwined,
standards. In so doing, the EEOC states:
"Undue hardship" means significant difficulty or expense and fo-
cuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular em-
ployer in relationship to the cost or difficulty of providing a specific
accommodation. Undue hardship refers not only to financial diffi-
culty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive,
substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter
the nature or operation of the business. An employer must assess
on a case-by-case basis whether a particular reasonable accommoda-
tion would cause undue hardship. 156
Interestingly, the EEOC closes its "undue hardship" summary by
stating, as in pertinent regulations, that "[t]he ADA's 'undue hard-
ship' standard is different from that applied by courts under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for religious accommodation." 15 7
151 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 6908A, at 5467-5 (2003) (citing gener-
ally Barnett, 535 U.S. at 399-403).
152 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
153 Id. at 401.
154 Id. at 402.
155 Id.; see 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 1 6908A, at 5467-6 (2003) (provid-
ing a comprehensive definition of undue hardship); 2 id. § 902, 6908A, at 5467-
28-31 (providing examples and explanations).
156 2 id. § 902, 6908A, at 5467-6 (citations omitted).
157 2 id. (citing, inter alia, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630 app., 1630.15(d) (1997)). Con-
versely, "[t]he differences between Title VII's religious accommodation clause and
the ADA's disability accommodation provision also suggest that Congress did not in-
tend Title VII cases to be persuasive authority in an ADA case." The Supreme Court,
2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116 HARv. L. REV. 200, 349 (2002). As the House Report
on the ADA provided, "[b]y contrast, under the ADA, reasonable accommodations
must be provided unless they rise to the level of 'requiring significant difficulty or
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WRFA 2003, albeit not as comprehensively, provides accommoda-
tion to relevant employees in a manner quite similar to the ADA.
First, the Act defines "employee" as an individual "who, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation, is qualified to perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."158 Then, as described above, the Act provides that "undue
hardship" is "an accommodation requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense," 159 and notes that, similar to the ADA, such a determination
should be made based on such factors as (1) "the identifiable cost of
the accommodation, including the costs of loss of productivity and of
retraining or hiring employees or transferring employees"; 160 (2) "the
overall financial resources and size of the employer involved, relative
to the number of its employees";161 and (3) the location and relation-
ship among employer facilities. 162 In a manner seemingly unique to
religious discrimination, the Act also proposes that "essential func-
tions" are "the core requirements of an employment position" 163 and
not any required restrictions on clothing, time off, or "other practices
that may have a temporary or tangential impact" on job perform-
ance. 164 Finally, the Act would codify the case holdings described
above that accommodations are "reasonable" if they remove "the con-
flict between employment requirements and the religious observance
or practice of the employee" 165 and would expressly forbid the exclu-
sion of religious purposes from general leave policies such as the pol-
icy involved in the Philbrook case. 166
Based on the foregoing, the similarities between the approach
taken by the ADA and that proposed by WRFA 2003, either by express
statutory language or by interpretive regulation, are rather striking.
Indeed, the sponsors of the latter piece of legislation have expressly
cited the ADA as a model. For example, as Senator Kerry stated in
introducing the legislation, WRFA 2003's "common sense definition
of undue hardship is used in the Americans with Disabilities Act and
expense' on the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute-i.e.,
a significantly higher standard than that articulated in Hardison." Eckles v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-
485(11), at 68 (1990)).
158 S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2003).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. § 2(b).
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has worked well in that context."1 67 Both statutes take a similar ap-
proach to those covered by their terms (i.e., definitions of "employee"
and "qualified individual"); both define "undue hardship" in like
manner, both in its level ("requiring significant difficulty or expense")
and in its factors; and both include conflict resolution as a goal (ei-
ther in whole or in part) in assessing "reasonableness" (although Bar-
nett's "ordinarily or in the run of cases" assumes a level of
objectiveness that may not be readily transferable in the subjective
world of "religious practice," as that term is defined by the courts and
the EEOC).
Notwithstanding their shared aspects, the relevant provisions
cited above reveal that the statutory (and/or regulatory) language of
the ADA and WRFA 2003 also differ in several important ways, some
of which, as discussed below, figure quite prominently in assessing the
wisdom of the similarities that they do, in fact, maintain. First, WRFA
2003 lacks anything close to the legislative findings of the ADA. In
fact, there appear to be no justifications whatsoever built into the text
of the Act itself.168 Second, and along the same lines as the first, the
ADA is intended to protect, if necessary, only those with a "disability,"
which it defines generally as those with an impairment "that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities,"1 69 and which it
numbered in 1990 at about forty-three million persons. 170 WRFA
2003 lacks any such definitional limitation on its covered population,
other than that implied through the EEOC's definition of "relig-
ion,"171 and its extent of coverage could conceivably extend to every
American working for an employer covered by Title VII. 172 Third, as
noted above, resolution of the conflict between an employee's disabil-
ity and relevant employer policy (i.e., "effective in meeting the needs
of the individual") is but one factor in the ADA's determination of
reasonableness, whereas it is, in essence, the sole factor under WRFA
2003 (i.e., "the conflict between employment requirements and the
religious observance or practice of the employee"), a distinction
pointing to the real potential for an even further heightened accom-
modation duty on the part of the employer under the latter statute. 173
167 149 CONG. REC. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
168 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (2000), with S. 893 § 2.
169 See 29 C.F.R. § 16 30.2(g)(1) (2003).
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (a) (1).
171 See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
172 See Clegg, supra note 23, at 58 (explaining that, unlike the ADA, WRFA 2003
"includes potentially everyone").
173 See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 1 6908A, at 5467-5 (2003); S. 893
§ 2(b).
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Finally, and perhaps most pertinently to the present discussion, the
ADA expressly provides that its theory of discrimination protection is
"based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individu-
als."1 74 Although WRFA 2003 may imply such a theory, it is left unsaid
in the statutory text, and, in any event, is cause for concern, as this
Article aims to establish.
In both similarity and difference, a comparison of the ADA and
WRFA 2003, at least in their statutory language and/or accompanying
regulation(s) (if not application) provides quite fertile ground for as-
sessing the implications of using the "disability model" in the religious
accommodation analysis. To paraphrase Senator Kerry, although the
provisions of the ADA (accompanied by relevant regulations) may
have arguably "worked well in [the disability] context, '175 it is far from
clear that they would prove as successful in the religious practice
context.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISABILITY MODEL
Once again, in adopting the ADA's "significant difficulty or ex-
pense" standard as its "undue hardship" ceiling, WRFA 2003 proposes
a much higher obligation on covered employers than that espoused
by the Supreme Court in Hardison. Moreover, in requiring such du-
ties in the realm of individual religious practice, this obligation is
heightened even further. In borrowing the statutory approach of the
ADA, the Act may be intended to incorporate a theory of accommoda-
tion that "strikes an appropriate balance between religious accommo-
dation, while ensuring that an undue burden is not forced upon
American employers."' 76 Yet, as laudable as this goal may be, the
practical results of this effort at a supposed "balance" might prove
otherwise.
In reviewing Tide VII as it would be amended by the Act, its rele-
vant protection extends to individuals "who, with or without reasona-
ble accommodation" are "qualified to perform the essential
functions" 177 of the job at issue, but are denied accommodation "be-
cause of' their "religion." 78 Under the ADA, the "essential functions"
qualifier is designed "simply to show that disabled persons have the
same opportunities available to them as are available to non-disabled
persons," enhanced, if at all, only by a "reasonable accommoda-
174 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (a) (7).
175 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
176 Id. at S5352 (statement of Sen. Santorum).
177 S. 893 § 2(a)(4).
178 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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tion.' 179 Although this principle in the religious context might ap-
pear sound at first blush, both what it includes and what is does not
include under WRFA 2003 show it to be rather meaningless.
In its inclusive use as a prima facie threshold for a plaintiff,180 any
showing of the "essential functions" requirement is almost entirely
within the power of the plaintiff. As under the ADA, such determina-
tions would most likely be made on a case-by-case basis with primary
consideration to employer preferences in establishing the existence
and extent of such functions, 8 1 but given the individual and subjec-
tive nature of religion and its attendant practice(s), at least as inter-
preted by the EEOC, 18 2 the question of performing such functions is
taken out of employers' hands, absent a challenge to the sincerity of
the religious practice leading to the alleged conflict (or, as is more
likely in this prima facie context, the lack of such conflict). 8 3 More
importantly, however, by excluding, as it does categorically, functions
such as required clothing and adherence to attendance rules from its
statutory definition of "essential functions,"'18 4 the Act deprives em-
ployers from relying on what, at least in some cases, they might deem
to be quite "essential" job tasks.18 5 The case-by-case analysis would
presumably remain, but the Act's express exclusion of leave and cloth-
ing does create significant definitional difficulties not otherwise
shared by the ADA. 18 6
The practical implications of the Act's "reasonableness" defini-
tion are even more striking. As noted above, the ADA, as applied and
interpreted, presents a multi-factored approach to its "reasonable-
ness" determination that incorporates an objective standard (i.e., "or-
179 Jenkins v. Northwood Rehab. & Extended Care Facility, 267 F. Supp. 2d 282,
286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
180 See Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, 147 F.3d 784, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that passenger assistance was an essential function of a ticket taker's position).
181 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2003).
182 See id. § 1605.1.
183 See EEOC v. Uni6n Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantaril-
lados, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting that "[t]he element of sincerity is
fundamental, since 'if the religious beliefs that apparently prompted a request are not
sincerely held, there has been no showing of a religious observance or practice that
conflicts with an employment requirement'") (quoting EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1997)).
184 See S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (4) (2003).
185 See, e.g., Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998)
(asserting that, in an ADA case, "attendance at work is a necessary job function").
186 Strictly interpreted, there is no "exception to the exception," even based on
safety or other concerns. See S. 893 § 2(b). Indeed, under the proposed statutory
language, "temporary or tangential impact" does not refer to clothing or leave poli-
cies. See id.
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dinarily or in the run of cases"). 187 On the other hand, WRFA 2003
provides that the sole factor for its "reasonableness" determination is
that "the accommodation shall remove the conflict between employ-
ment requirements and the religious observance or practice of the
employee." 188 The imposition of this standard necessarily demands a
black-and-white approach to accommodation that, as in the "essential
function" analysis, is subject to whatever religious practice, whether
objective or subjective, is chosen by the relevant employee. 189 In this
way, it can be argued that "WRFA constructively pushes 'reasonable'
into the realm of 'absolute' by stripping the employer of discretion in
business decision making."1 90 Indeed, as Senator Santorum concedes,
employers in this area are dealing with "personal religious standards
which govern personal activity." 91 Consequently, "undue burden"
would, in effect, become the ultimate determinant (or "exception")192
in assessing whether or not a violation of Title VII, as amended by
WRFA 2003, has been committed by an employer otherwise covered
by its terms.
Based on the foregoing and the statutory text, the cause for the
greatest concern, at least from a practical perspective, is the implica-
tions from the "significant difficulty or expense" level of "undue hard-
ship"' 93 proposed by WRFA 2003, which would overrule the "de
minimis" standard stated by Hardison to have been the will of Con-
gress in its amendment of section 701(j).194 In this, comparisons of
cases under the ADA's "significant difficulty or expense" test, together
with pertinent EEOC guidance, and those under the current 701 (j)/
Hardison "de minimis" standard offer predictive insight. Indeed, as
the House Report on the ADA provided, the ADA mandates "a signifi-
cantly higher standard" of "undue hardship" than that now required
187 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399-403 (2002) (applying the
EEOC guidelines); 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 6908A, at 5467-5 (2003).
188 S. 893 § 2(b).
189 As Professor Kaminer points out, some courts have indicated that the "flexible"
accommodation process between employers and employees should include a willing-
ness on the part of employees to "compromise" their beliefs. See Kaminer, supra note
19, at 599. However, as she points out, this position has been largely rejected by "most
courts examining the issue." Id. at 600 (citing Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671
F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978); EEOC
v. IBP, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 147 (C.D. Ill. 1993)).
190 Gawlik, supra note 23, at 263 (discussing earlier, yet similarly worded, versions
of WRFA 2003).
191 149 CONG. REC. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
192 See Gawlik, supra note 23, at 266-68.
193 S. 893 § 2(a)(4).
194 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977).
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by Title VII for accommodation of religious practices. 195 Thus, con-
siderations of financial costs, administrative burdens, administrative
complexity, and any other negative impacts on business, all of which
would factor into the Act's standard by virtue of their role in the
ADA's "undue hardship" analysis, 196 would naturally lead to an accom-
modation significantly higher than "de minimis."
For example, under the ADA, the hiring of a "reader" to assist an
employee with a vision disability may be a "reasonable accommoda-
tion" without "undue hardship" for a larger employer, even though
this could cost thousands of dollars (i.e., something which would cer-
tainly be higher than "de minimis").19 7 Similarly, private parking for a
walking impaired employee at a cost of about $400 per month, and a
text telephone for a hearing impaired employee at a cost of several
hundred dollars (both of which are more than "de minimis"
amounts), have been posited as "reasonable accommodations" for rel-
evant nonprofit employers.1 98 Even Hardison would almost certainly
come out differently under the Act's standard. As Justice Marshall
noted in dissent, the accommodation sought there involved, at most,
additional overtime for another at "$150 for three months, at which
time [Hardison] would have been eligible to transfer back" to a non-
conflicting shift.199 Given that various members of the Court dis-
agreed on whether this cost would even be "de minimis," one can
deduce that a majority would most likely consider it less than "signifi-
cant."200 As the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, and contrary to the
195 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 68 (1990).
196 See Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 737 (D.
Md. 1996) (placing initial burden of proof on plaintiff); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,111 (10) (B) (2000) (describing a qualified employee as one who can perform the
essential functions of the position); S. 893 § 2(a) (4) (same).
197 See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 6908A, at 5467-11 (2003); see also
Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that the Reha-
bilitation Act requires "part-time" readers for blind typists at a state Department of
Public Welfare at a cost of $6638 per year, per typist). In reviewing Nelson, note that
"the substantive standards for determining liability under [the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act] are the same." Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). As Alan Schuchman points out, both the Hardison and Nelson decisions
"vividly demonstrate the differing results of 'reasonable accommodation' under the
two acts." Schuchman, supra note 23, at 746.
198 See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1514, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that a parking space in New York City at a cost of $300-$520 per month for a staff
attorney survives a motion to dismiss); Bryant, 923 F. Supp. at 730 (procuring a text
telephone, or IN, device at a cost of $279 is reasonable for a local nonprofit con-
sumer information agency).
199 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200 See id. at 84; see also id. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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approach taken by the Court in Hardison, accommodation under the
ADA necessarily contemplates an "extra cost" for disabled
employees.201
With regard to shift policies, work breaks, transfer of functions,
safety issues, and other accommodations that do not, at least directly,
involve financial costs, the Act's "significant difficulty or expense" stan-
dard would also increase burdens on employers in the religious ac-
commodation context beyond those presently required (e.g.,
voluntary shift swaps, unpaid leave).202 Under the "de minimis" stan-
dard of Hardison, and as noted in the opening paragraph of this Arti-
cle, employers are generally not required to impose "shift and job
preferences" on other employees,20 3 need not absorb efficiency losses
from regular breaks or leave, 20 4 and need not take any action that
"would impair safety at the workplace."2 0 5 Under the ADA approach,
and therefore that of WRFA 2003, however, involuntary shift and job
modifications may very well be mandated 20 6 (at least absent a collec-
tively bargained agreement or firmly established seniority system, as in
Barnett).207 Moreover, modifications for breaks or leave, and a trans-
201 Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000). In fact,
as one federal district court has opined, "the only categorical limit on the obligation
to accommodate [under the ADA standard] appears to be cases of extraordinary
cost." Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, 149 (N.D.N.Y.
1999); see, e.g., Balls v. AT&T Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding
a $12 million voice-activated system for carpal tunnel syndrome an undue hardship).
202 See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (finding
that employers are required under Title VII to provide leave for religious obser-
vance); Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriffs Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th Cir.
1994) (upholding voluntary shift swaps as "reasonable" accommodations under Title
VII).
203 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
204 See WoLF ET AL., supra note 8, at 121-24 (discussing EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375
(6th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'l, 597 F. Supp. 1007 (D.P.R. 1984), affd,
821 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1987)).
205 See id. at 115; see also Bhatia v. Chevron USA, Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383-84 (9th
Cir. 1984) (approving of grooming standards under a "de minimis" safety rationale).
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(b) (2000) (listing "job restructuring" as a "reasona-
ble accommodation" under the ADA).
207 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002) (holding that modifi-
cations to established seniority rules are not required in "the run of cases"); see also
Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that collec-
tively bargained seniority rights need not be adjusted as an accommodation). How-
ever, even if a collective bargaining agreement would be violated, the EEOC cites
Barnett for the proposition that there may be "special circumstances" under which
reassignment might be reasonable "despite the existence of a seniority system." 2
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 6908A, at 5467-23 (2003) (citing Barnett, 535
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fer of functions (though not "essential" ones) are contemplated
under the accommodation standard of "significant difficulty or ex-
pense."208 Furthermore, efficiency gaps are necessarily considered, at
least to an extent greater than "de minimis," as part of the employer's
accommodation duty.209 Finally, as far as safety is concerned, under
the ADA, danger to one's self does not, in itself, constitute an "undue
hardship,"210 and given that, unlike the ADA, WRFA 2003 does not
offer a "direct threat to others" exception to accommodation duties,
safety-either for one's self or for others (typically, coworkers or cus-
tomers)-may similarly not alleviate an employer from an accommo-
dation duty.21' This omission might prove interesting in the "snake
handling" hypothetical offered in the opening paragraph above.
In discussing accommodation duties under WRFA 2003, one
should also note the particular problem that may arise in adherence
U.S. at 405-06). At a minimum, it should be noted that WRFA 2003 did remove a
particularly objectionable seniority based provision in earlier versions of the legisla-
tion, namely express language providing that "[i]t shall not be a defense to a claim of
unlawful employment practice ... that such accommodation would be in violation of
a bona fide seniority system." Baxter, supra note 79, at 6 (quoting H.R. 4237, 106th
Cong. § 2(b) (4) (A) (2000)) (emphasis added); cf S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003) (retain-
ing the seniority based provision).
208 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397-98 (discussing modifications to neutral break or
leave rules and citing, inter alia, Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d
638, 648 (1st Cir. 2000), on the latter); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2003)
(stating that 'Job restructuring" may be a "reasonable accommodation"); 2 EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902, 1 6908A, at 5467-28 to 5467-29 (2003) (noting that an
employer is to transfer "marginal" functions to coworkers if there is no "significant
disruption to its operation").
209 Indeed, "Congress rejected efficiency as the guiding principle for the ADA
and . . . the Act sometimes requires inefficient actions." Schwab & Willborn, supra
note 28, at 1202-03 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111(10), 12,112(b)(5)(A); Gregory S.
Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990)).
210 See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 209-10 (1991)).
211 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12,113 (discussing that, under the ADA, employers may
require "that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace"), with S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003) (containing no such
mention of health or safety exceptions, for the employee or anyone else, under WRFA
2003). Possible protection may reside in a dangerous plaintiff not otherwise being
"qualified" to perform the "essential functions," see EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d
135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying this analysis in the ADA context), but it would seem
difficult to apply this notion to willful religious conduct that would likely be more
ancillary to actual job performance than danger from a physical or mental disability.
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to other legal responsibilities. 212 In this, perhaps the most prominent
of responsibilities, at least according to the scholarly literature, is an
employer's countervailing obligation under Title VII to maintain a
work environment free from hostility, including that of a religious na-
ture. At present, courts have not interpreted the "de minimis" stan-
dard to require an employer to accommodate religious conduct that
might otherwise violate Title VII hostile work environment rules of
conduct.213 As the Eighth Circuit has posited, "Tide VII does not re-
quire an employer to allow an employee to impose his religious views
on others."214 However, under the ADA accommodation standard
proposed by WRFA 2003, and in light of the failure of the 1993 EEOC
guidelines to apply hostile environment theory to religious activity in a
more systematic way,215 avoidance of harassment may not serve as
much of a defense to accommodation. 216 Thus, the current balance
would most likely be upset, and, as a result, employers would be
placed more firmly than ever "between a rock and a hard place"2 17 in
meeting their respective Title VII obligations.
In assessing the foregoing increases in accommodation obliga-
tions that might be imposed on employers under the Act, it is impor-
tant to remember that the determination of "undue hardship" would
be made on a "case-by-case" basis.218 As under the ADA, it would con-
stitute a "multi-faceted, fact-intensive [inquiry], requiring considera-
tion of: (1) financial cost, (2) additional administrative burden, (3)
complexity of implementation, and (4) any negative impact.., on the
212 See WoLF ET AL., supra note 8, at 118-19 (discussing United States v. Bd. of
Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990), and citing, inter alia, Bhatia v. Chevron USA, Inc.,
734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984)).
213 See Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
accommodation of certain hostile letters to coworkers would not be required).
214 Wilson v. US West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that accommodation of the wearing of a religious button would not be required if
it would unduly offend coworkers).
215 See Betty L. Dunkum, Where to Draw the Line: Handling Religious Harassment Issues
in the Wake of the Failed EEOC Guidelines, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953, 985 (1996)
(discussing the inherent conflict of the failed guidelines with the present accommo-
dation requirements of Title VII).
216 See DelPo, supra note 45, at 349 (discussing potential for increased "hostile
environment" conflict with WRFA standards); cf Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226
F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
209-10 (1991), in its discussion of preemption of, at least, state tort law in meeting
accommodation obligations under the ADA).
217 Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021.
218 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2003) (listing the pertinent ADA regulations).
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operation of the employer's business." 219 As Senator Santorum has
noted, "[thus, a smaller business with less resources and personnel
would not be asked to accommodate religious employees in exactly
the same fashion as would a large manufacturing concern."220 Al-
though these considerations are offered in an effort to balance relig-
ious and business interests, it is somewhat odd that one's "first
freedom," as the Senator refers to religious accommodation in this
context,221 should not be subject to any compromises save those in-
volving the size and/or resources of one's employer.222 Of course, as
discussed in greater detail below, this is perhaps the central theoreti-
cal problem facing the religious accommodation in employment di-
lemma, a dilemma typified by Title VII's very definition of "religion"
itself as something with both reasonable and hardship boundaries. 223
In sum, the practical consequences of the enactment of WRFA
2003 would be significant. In replacing Hardison's "de minimis" stan-
dard of accommodation, and, thus, section 701 (j), with the ADA's
"significant difficulty or expense" test, the Act would require covered
employers to bear greater financial costs and would impose upon
them a heightened duty to alter their leave, break, shift, job structure,
or even safety policies when necessary to accommodate the religious
practices of its employees. These practical, or "business," conse-
quences have generally formed the bulk of the grounds for opposition
to the Act in its manifestations in earlier Congressional legislation.224
Even granting these practical results, however, perhaps the greatest
impact of the Act may lie in its theoretical understanding of religion,
an understanding that cuts to the heart of a debate over not only the
219 Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 737 (D.
Md. 1996) (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10) (B) (2000) (describing
the four factors to consider in determining whether there is an undue burden under
the ADA); S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2003) (describing the three factors to con-
sider in determining if undue hardship exists).
220 149 CONG. REc. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
Notably, Senator Santorum's remarks on the relative impact of "undue burden" re-
flect the perspective articulated by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, where he argued that "to conclude that TWA, one of the largest
air carriers in the Nation, would have suffered undue hardship had it done anything
more defies both reason and common sense." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
222 Compare S. 893 § 2(b) (mandating resolution of the "conflict" between em-
ployer policy and employee religious practice), with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (discussing
ADA regulations, analogous to those that would likely be promulgated under WRFA
2003, that indicate a flexible, case-by-case approach to "undue hardship").
223 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining "religion" under Title VII).
224 See Eckstrom, supra note 21.
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role of religion in the workplace, but also over the very nature of relig-
ion in society as a whole.
V. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE IMMUTABLE PROBLEM
As described above, "Title VII, as originally passed, treated relig-
ion the same as race, color, sex, or national origin."2 25 In so doing,
the original statute "prohibited discrimination, but contained no lan-
guage specifically requiring accommodation of religious employees,"
or of any other class of employees for that matter.226 With the amend-
ment of section 701 (j), of course, the accommodation principle was
added for "religion." Thus, not only does Title VII consider religion
comparable to qualities such as race, color, sex, or national origin for
purposes of protection from prejudicial discrimination, it affords re-
ligion even more protection by accommodation. In this manner, "the
final effect of an accommodation to an employee's religious beliefs is
to give that employee some benefits or preferential treatment to
which he would not otherwise be entitled."227
A. The "Belief' Boundary
The wisdom of treating religious belief (or status) itself as some-
thing worthy of the protection afforded such "suspect classes" as race
and national origin 228 in the workplace appears to be rather sound, or
at least not subject to much debate. Whether volitional or not, relig-
ious belief (or status), or the lack thereof, may be considered as fun-
damental to the "basic autonomy of identity and self-creation" of a
person, as either a citizen or an employee. 229 For this reason (and
perhaps others more utilitarian, such as a check on government, a
source of charity, or for support of public order), religious beliefs
have been singled out for protection in relationship with the state
from the beginning of the Republic. 230 As one scholar has noted, "for
225 Kaminer, supra note 19, at 580 (citations omitted); see also Moberly, supra note
32, at 3 (noting that "race and religion are generally treated similarly for Title VII
purposes").
226 Kaminer, supra note 19, at 580.
227 Kenneth G. Frantz, Religious Discrimination in Employment: An Examination of the
Employer's Duty to Accommodate, 1979 DETROIT C.L. REV. 205, 209.
228 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (noting "suspect
classifications" of race, religion, and national origin in the constitutional context).
229 Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmenta-
tion and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89,
95 (1990).
230 See Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 Wm. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 303, 332-45 (2001) (offering a structural approach to religious liberty);
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constitutional purposes, religious affiliation is an immutable charac-
teristic vis-I-vis state action, at least to the extent that the free exercise
clause condemns as invidious the penalizing of religious beliefs.
231
In this, as James Madison once argued, "the opinions of men, depend-
ing only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot
follow the dictates of other men. '232 Although the history is lim-
ited, 233 this idea of "religious freedom," both in its individual auton-
omy and state noninterference dimensions, is reflected in Title VII's
original protections, both in its inclusion of religious belief and in its
exclusion of affirmative accommodation. 23 4
In the employment context, protection of belief (or status) alone
not only reflects notions of "religious freedom" from constitutional
law, it also conforms with the theory of "equal treatment" that other-
wise frames the Civil Rights Act of 1964.235 Protection of belief, as in
the case of race or gender, is grounded in a policy of rooting out
particular forms of "prejudice" (commonly defined as an "opinion
formed . . . without knowledge or examination of the facts" 23 6) that
are not only deemed odious to society in general but which have no
corresponding, or at least no rational, public or market benefits. 237 In
extending this model to religious belief (as in 1964), there are no
objective costs placed on the employer, or anyone else for that matter,
other than a duty to refrain from the use of certain criteria in making
see also JOHN WITrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
44-45 (2000) (describing the benefits of religious freedom at the nation's Founding).
231 Brownstein, supra note 229, at 110 (citation and emphasis omitted).
232 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (Am. United for Separation of Church & State ed., 1965).
233 See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 600 (noting that race discrimination
was the primary issue focused on in the hearings, and because of this the problems of
including religious discrimination were not looked at as carefully as they perhaps
should have been).
234 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-36 (1970) (noting belief
coverage and no accommodation by both original Title VII and First Amendment);
Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 43, at 602-04 (tracing the constitutional origins of
Title VII).
235 SeeJolls, supra note 31, at 643 (citing Post, supra note 31, at 9-12).
236 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1384 (4th ed. 2000).
237 See Post, supra note 31, at 8 ("Antidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize wide-
spread forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based upon inaccu-
rate judgments about their worth or capacities."). Indeed, as the Court posited in
Criggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), Congress required under Title VII "the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment ... " Id. at
431.
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employment decisions that, at least in theory238 and/or in the long
run,
23 9 should have no effect on performance of the job at issue.240 In
this sense, the message is that prejudice does not pay, either in the
market or in the law.
In addition to the "equal treatment" of religious belief, the issue
of mutability or volition, or the lack thereof, also justifies protection in
the workplace. In this sense, and notwithstanding the constitutional
theories described above, protection of religious belief does not de-
mand any particular resolution of the mutability question, or, for that
matter, depend as heavily upon whether something should be charac-
terized by the EEOC or a court as a "religious" practice. As one
scholar has noted, "[i] t can be argued that religion is the only basis of
discrimination included in Title VII that is alterable... [o] n the other
hand, it can be argued that its inclusion in that group of bases [e.g.,
sex, race] indicates a congressional belief that it is not alterable or
238 As mentioned above, see supra note 72, Professor Jolls and others have chal-
lenged the "no cost" theory of nondiscrimination law (even absent affirmative accom-
modation requirements) in that there are situations where the theory requires
"employers to incur undeniable financial costs associated with employing the disfa-
vored group of employees." Jolls, supra note 31, at 645; see also Sharon Rabin-Mar-
galioth, Anti-Discrimination, Accommodation and Universal Mandates-Aren't They All the
Same?, 24 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 111, 125 (2003) (noting the "profitability" of
intentional discrimination in light of prejudice of customers or coworkers). In prac-
tice, this might very well be the case, but in developing a consistent and long-range
theory (and policy) of legal treatment, particularly regarding the imposition of affirm-
ative employer duties, the differences between action (i.e., accommodation) and
omission (i.e., nondiscrimination) are not only insightful in what they express about
the role of law in the employment arena, but also reflect the treatment of such mat-
ters by the pre-section 701 (j) courts in cases like Dewey, in the actions taken by Con-
gress in amending section 701(j) ("[T]he 701(j) requirement of religious
accommodation is based on a separate and distinct theory of discrimination." 2
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.4, 1 5004, at 4183 (1998)), and the current efforts
of WRFA 2003 itself. Indeed, it cannot be said that the obligations imposed by WRFA
2003 are implicit in Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964.
239 As Professors Schwab and Willborn have commented, "[t]he ability of law to
function as a preference-shaping mechanism, rather than simply a preference-ac-
cumulation mechanism, is becoming increasingly well recognized. There is consider-
able evidence that Title VII has changed existing preferences about the proper role of
women and African Americans in the workplace." Schwab & Willborn, supra note 28,
at 1217-18 (footnote omitted). Regarding "myths" of productivity differences in the
discrimination context, they continue, "[e]rroneous myths of this type, however, can
last onlyif a market failure causes employers to systematically ignore profitable oppor-
tunities to hire undervalued workers." Id. at 1220.
240 See id. at 1200 ("The central thrust of Title VII employs a 'sameness' model of
discrimination, requiring employers to treat African Americans and women exactly
the same as others; their race and sex must be ignored and employers must focus
instead on factors related to productivity.") (citations omitted).
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that people either are or are not religious. '241 The issue, of course, is
debatable.
Some might argue that "religious convictions frequently appear
to their possessors as immutable; something they did not choose, but
which chose them,"2 42 whereas others may argue that religion is "cho-
sen"243 and is "within the control of a person." 244 In all of this, unde-
niable "skepticism" by courts in assessing the validity of a religious
claim may stem "in part, from the fact that religion is a belief system
that cannot be logically or rationally proven, a fact that troubles some
courts in our modern rationalist society. '24 5 In any event, however
one resolves the matter, protection of belief offers a reasonable mid-
dle ground. Again, this protection seeks nothing other than exclusion
of a particular "prejudice." It also conveniently collapses potential ar-
eas of subjective overlap with race, gender, or national origin, in that
whether or not an employer or employee perceives a belief or charac-
teristic as arising under one or more of these "classes," it is protected. 246
As a result, even if one can prove that religious belief comes from
nature, nurture, or a combination of the two, the issue is largely irrele-
vant, not only in terms of an ultimate understanding in the law, but
also in terms of the cost to be borne by employers, employees, and
society generally in offering Title VII protection.
Although religious belief or status alone provides perhaps the
brightest coverage boundary, the "de minimis" accommodation stan-
dard also provides a range of protection that fulfills the "equal treat-
ment" antiprejudice goal without imposing inordinate costs on the
relevant parties. As the Court noted in applying this standard for sec-
tion 701 (j) in Hardison, "the paramount concern of Congress in en-
241 Schuchman, supra note 23, at 757.
242 Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 62 (1992).
243 Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 577, 590 (1997) (citingJamar, supra note 33,
at 727).
244 Post, supra note 31, at 8.
245 Kaminer, supra note 19, at 577-78. The Court noted in Lyng v. Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), that it "cannot determine the truth
of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here." Id. at 449. In so
doing (or not doing), the courts generally examine only the sincerity of belief, rather
than the substance thereof. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 243, at 599 (citing
cases).
246 See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A
Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FoRDRAM U",B. L.J. 1075, 1098 n.128
(1996) (citing Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Dis-
crimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 833 (1994), for the proposition
that "religion" is a factor in ethnicity and "national origin" assessments).
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acting Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in
employment."247 Certainly in "requiring, at least in certain instances,
that employees who claim the need for religious accommodation be
treated differently from other employees, Tide VII's religious accom-
modation provision poses a challenge to the liberal, or neutral, ideol-
ogy embedded in the interpretation of the remainder of the
statute."248 Yet, a "de minimis" standard does not impose as inordi-
nate a "challenge" as, say, "significant difficulty or expense," nor does
it deviate significantly from the goal of "equal treatment" in targeting
intentional discrimination that might otherwise lie hidden behind a
neutral workplace rule-in a manner similar to the "disparate impact"
theory of discrimination under Title VII generally, 249 albeit resulting
in individual exceptions rather than a class based remedy.250 In this
sense, the "de minimis" standard is more faithful (no pun intended)
to the "neutral ideology" of Title VII than one might initially think.
B. The "Postjudice" of "Significant Difficulty of Expense"
Unlike belief or status alone, or even a "de minimis" test of ac-
commodation, the "significant difficulty or expense" standard of
WRFA 2003 does not properly address the values of "equal treatment"
and restraint in resolving theological disputes over the nature of relig-
ion. First, in imposing "significant difficulty or expense," the Act con-
cretely and unambiguously affords preferential treatment for religious
practices and does so at an affirmative cost to employers and their
business. Second, in adopting the ADA's theory of accommodation,
the Act effectively demands certain conclusions about the nature of
religion, either as an immutable notion or as something that is so im-
portant that its attendant activities should be subsidized by other citi-
zens, either of which unduly enmesh the Congress (and, thereby, the
247 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977).
248 Engle, supra note 32, at 320.
249 The similarity between "de minimis" accommodation and "disparate impact"
theory can also be seen in their defenses in that both relieve an employer of liability if
relevant changes would impose "real economic costs on the employer." See Schwab &
Willborn, supra note 28, at 1199, 1241 (describing disparate impact cost/productivity
theory).
250 See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 238, at 124 (describing disparate impact law
examples of accommodation under Title VII); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000)
(outlining Title ViI's relevant treatment of "disparate impact" theory via the Civil
Rights Act of 1991); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) (adopting
of the theory by Supreme Court). As noted, a finding of illegal "disparate impact"
discrimination typically demands a complete elimination of the policy or rule at issue,
rather than individual exceptions to the rule, as in the accommodation model. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
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courts) into matters beyond its expertise, or perhaps even beyond its
power. Finally, in its proposal of a "significant difficulty or expense"
accommodation test for employers, the Act finds itself in conflict with
the analogous constitutional standard otherwise required of the
state in matters of religion, namely that of neutrality and
nonentanglement.
As discussed above, the "normal duty under Title VII is not to
treat employees differently in an adverse manner based on the listed
characteristics," whereas in the case of religious accommodation, par-
ticularly as enunciated by WRFA 2003, "an employer has a duty to
discriminate in favor of certain employees by granting an employee
special treatment. ' 25 1 Some, including Professor Christine Jolls,
might dispute the difference in cost between current accommodation
and nondiscrimination levels where the latter would regulate deci-
sions that might otherwise, at least now, be economically rational.252
Nevertheless, by adopting the ADA's high standard and applying it to
an even wider range of employees by factors that are often unrelated
to job performance or discrimination history, WRFA 2003 would place
an unprecedented and inordinate burden on employers (and, poten-
tially, coworkers as well) that inures solely to the benefit of religious
concerns. 25 3 Of course, the "affected class" includes potentially any
employee of a covered employer who engages in, or is otherwise af-
fected by,254 religious activity, unlike the forty-three million persons
251 Jamar, supra note 33, at 742.
252 SeeJolls, supra note 31, at 645; see also Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 238, at
123-27 (discussing the overlaps in employer cost between accommodation and non-
discrimination standards as they presently operate in certain areas of modern discrim-
ination law).
253 See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 28, at 1200 (describing the "sameness"
model of Title VII and the "difference" model of ADA). Compare US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (stating that ADA "accommodation" necessarily
"requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferen-
tially"), with Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (finding
that section 701 (j) of Title VII does not "involve unequal treatment of employees on
the basis of their religion").
254 It should be noted that discrimination "because of" religion can also protect
the nonreligious employee, whether from coworker harassment or from the imposi-
tion of religious requirements or special treatment of religion by employers. See, e.g.,
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 971-74 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing "religious"
harassment); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-45 (5th
Cir. 1975) (stating that atheist objections to mandatory religious meetings are actiona-
ble); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544, 551 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (ex-
ploring harassment in a "Christian workplace").
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estimated by Congress to benefit from ADA protection. 25 5 Yet, the
"religion" trigger for protection still results in an inevitable discrimi-
nation among the various requests and/or needs facing a covered em-
ployer.256 As under the ADA, the Act's "clear purpose [is] to require
employers to treat individuals [seeking accommodation] more favora-
bly than they had been treated prior to the Act. 25 7
Turning from the profane to the sacred, the "significant difficulty
or expense" test2 58 can be seen as inevitably leading to one (or both)
of the following two conclusions about the nature of religious activity:
(1) it is immutable and, therefore, must be accommodated to elimi-
nate prejudice and ensure equal opportunity; or (2) regardless of mu-
tability, it is of such a high value that it should be protected anyway.
Either one of these conclusions is suspect, at least as support for the
"significant" accommodation standard imposed by the Act. The for-
mer is neither supported by relevant notions of mutability in other
contexts, including the antiprejudice model of Title VII, nor does it
have sufficient policy roots to mandate the imposition of resulting
costs on employers. The latter simply ignores the relevant values oth-
erwise associated with the protection of "action rights," in either the
constitutional or other analogous legal contexts.
Although notions of immutability would operate somewhat in-
nocuously under the "de minimis" approach of Hardison, the height-
ened demands of WRFA 2003 inevitably lend them a greater
significance, even as compared to their use in the disability arena. As
one commentator has remarked, "one might, for instance, argue that
no one chooses to be disabled, but you are able to choose your relig-
ious beliefs and practices," although " [ t]o be sure, it might be coun-
tered that one doesn't choose one's beliefs in the same way that one
chooses a sweater."259 The Supreme Court advanced the former no-
tion in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., when, in striking down a law
prohibiting employers from requiring employees to work on their
Sabbath, it rejected the "right not to work on whatever day [employ-
255 See Clegg, supra note 23, at 59 (asserting that WRFA 2003 includes potentially
everyone); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a) (contemplating in the introduction to the
ADA the assistance to forty-three million persons).
256 Some may dispute a "redistribution" of benefits in favor of the accommodated
employee, see Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 238, at 114, particularly when all employ-
ees are potentially covered by WRFA 2003, see Clegg, supra note 23, at 59, yet the
heightened cost imposed on the employer is unmistakable.
257 Schwab & Willborn, supra note 28, at 1209.
258 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A) ("The term 'undue hardship' means an action re-
quiring significant difficulty or expense ....
259 See Clegg, supra note 23, at 59.
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ees] designate as their Sabbath." 260 In response, Professor Stephen
Carter has noted that some may see it differently, such as the 'Jewish
people" who "have been under the impression for some 3,000 years
that this choice was made by God."26 1 The sponsors of both the sec-
tion 701(j) amendment and the Act largely seem to take the latter
approach, a conclusion made most obvious by including "observance
and practice" (albeit "somewhat awkwardly") 262 in their definition of
"religion" itself.263 "Reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship" modify these definitions, but by including "acts" in a statute (Ti-
tle VII) otherwise dedicated to prohibiting "status" prejudice,
inferences of immutability come quite easily.
The problem with the Act's apparent implication of immutability
is not that it is inherently wrong about the nature of religion. It may
be; it may not be. Many statesmen, philosophers, theologians, and
academics have been on either side of the question to one extent or
another.264 The problem is that it does not fit the model otherwise
presented by Title VII.265 Again, the issue is accommodation of action
(often involving, frankly, affirmative movements), not prejudice
against characteristics (including, perhaps, beliefs) beyond one's con-
260 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (emphasis added).
261 CARTER, supra note 79, at 5-6 (citations omitted).
262 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986).
263 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
264 For examples of those adopting the immutability (or involuntariness) position,
at least to the extent of religious belief, see Garvey, supra note 24, at 800 (citing Mar-
tin Luther for an involuntariness concept); Hall, supra note 242, at 62 (citing Thomas
Jefferson and, to a lesser degree, James Madison, for the notion that religious "opin-
ions and belief of men depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the
evidence proposed to their minds"); and Jerry K. Robbins, Believing for Benefit: Notes on
Pascal and James, 9 WORD & WORLD 166 (1989) (discussing Sigmund Freud's proposal
of religious beliefs as possible delusions). For examples of those adopting the muta-
bility (or voluntariness) position, see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980)
(stating that the only status regulated by Title VII that is a choice is religion); SECOND
VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HuMANAE [DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LiB-
ERTY], reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE BASIC SIXTEEN DOcUMENTS 554 (Austin
Flannery, O.P. ed., 1996) (teaching that "the practice of religion of its very nature
consists primarily of those voluntary and free internal acts by which human beings
direct themselves to God");Jamar, supra note 33, at 727, 747 ("[B]eliefs and concepts
are a matter of choice."); and Robbins, supra, at 167-70 (presenting the religious
choice theories of Blaise Pascal and William James).
265 See Engle, supra note 32, at 320 (arguing that, because requiring accommoda-
tion of religious beliefs forces employers to treat employees differently, Title VII's
requirement of religious accommodation is not consistent with Title VII's require-
ment of equal treatment for other employee differences).
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trol.26 6 Moreover, even if these actions are rooted in an "immutable"
belief, they still involve an invocation of the will with consequences
that, by the very nature of the burdens imposed by the Act beyond
belief or "de minimis" accommodation, impact one's performance of
the job. 267 Belief may be immutable, as may be the desire to engage
in religious practices, but it is difficult to conclude that the engage-
ment in the practices themselves is involuntary, akin to the M'Naghten
or "irresistible impulse" rules in criminal law.268 Whether it is Sabbath
observance, prayer, grooming, proselytizing, or refraining from things
contrary thereto, a volitional act, at least at some level, is required.
Indeed, even if one denies the existence of free will generally, the very
process of accommodation itself necessarily assumes some level of
both understanding and volition on the part of both employer and
employee,2 69 a point acknowledged, at least to a limited extent, by
section 701(j) itself in its use of "reasonable" and "undue" qualifi-
ers270 and by Senator Santorum's own rejection of the prospect of be-
ing "forced to choose between keeping [one's] faith and keeping
[one's] job" in introducing the Act. 27 1
266 As Professor Engle has argued, Title VII's accommodation provisions challenge
the "status-conduct distinction" that "seems firmly entrenched in the race, national
origin, and sex cases." Id. at 354. WRFA 2003 would only further this challenge. See
Jamar, supra note 33, at 747 ("Employment actions taken on the basis of differences
in philosophy, differences in approach to life, and differences in religious belief are
qualitatively different from those taken on mere status and may be easier tojustify.").
267 See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 28, at 1200 (arguing that when employers
are required to treat certain employees differently or more favorably, employers are
being regulated in a different manner than they are under Title VII, which bans dis-
similar treatment of employees).
268 The M'Naghten test provides that a person is not criminally responsible if he
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong." Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 455 (6th
Cir. 1960) (citing M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)). "Irresistible im-
pulse" provides that even if one knows that an act is wrong, he is still not responsible if
he was, by disease of the mind, unable "to resist doing wrong or to control his acts."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 390 (4th ed. 2003) (citing, inter alia, Parsons v.
State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887)).
269 Although employees are generally not required to compromise their religious
beliefs, see Kaminer, supra note 19, at 599-600, section 701 (j) does contemplate a
"process" of accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). As the Supreme Court
posited in Philbrook, "bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an accept-
able reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the
employer's business." Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted).
270 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
271 149 CONG. REc. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
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ProfessorJohn Garvey argues that in the constitutional context of
free exercise, lessons of cognition and volition from the M'Naghten
"insanity" test might prove helpful in understanding religious prac-
tice. 272 In this sense, a religious actor might be protected because
either he "did not know the nature" of his actions (cognition) or he
lacked the ability "to conform" them "to [the workplace] norms" (voli-
tion). 2 73 Even Professor Garvey admits, however, that such concepts
may be limited to their context, namely "retribution" of criminal law
rather than free exercise vis-A-vis the state274 or, for our purposes, a
notion of accommodation even further removed from state power
concerns. Moreover, even if a "God made me do it" rationale is at
issue, the cognitive requirements of securing the accommodation
right (i.e., negotiating the request), coupled with the volitional nature
of exercising that right in the employment arena (i.e., actually engag-
ing or not engaging in the activity), should lead to its rejection here.
This conclusion is necessarily even stronger under an "irresistible im-
pulse" test (i.e., volition only). Finally, given the religiosity of Ameri-
cans, 275 it would seem somewhat of a stretch to conclude that ours is a
nation of "religious insanity" (nor would Professor Garvey presumably
so claim), much less that such irrationality should be subsidized by the
market.
The net result of WRFA 2003's implicit treatment of religious
practice as immutable or involuntary, with definitive costs associated
with such treatment, would be a prohibition of what one might call
"postjudice." In this sense, unlike the "prejudicial" actions regulated
by the present provisions of Title VII (i.e., protection from "opinion
formed" based on certain characteristics "without knowledge or exam-
ination of the facts"2 76), the additional requirements imposed by the
Act ultimately regulate decisions made after the objective facts are
known, namely those regarding the performance of the relevant job
functions. 277 It could be argued that the ADA similarly regulates deci-
272 See Garvey, supra note 24, at 798-801.
273 Id. at 798.
274 Id. at 800 ("Where retribution is not an issue ... we may have fewer scruples
about subjecting the religious claimant to the same rules that apply to everyone
else.").
275 Kaminer, supra note 19, at 576.
276 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcrIONARY, supra note 236, at 1384; Post, supra
note 31, at 8.
277 See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 28, at 1200 (discussing how Title VII em-
ploys a sameness model requiring all employees be treated similarly, and how other
laws requiring special treatment for certain employees do not fit this model). See
generally 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.4, 5004, at 4183 (2003) ("[The] re-
quirement of religious accommodation is based on a separate and distinct theory of
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sions based "on ,the facts." However, not only do such provisions still
aim to protect limitations undeniably beyond one's control,278 they
also do so in light of the objective proof of those limitations (e.g.,
medical documentation), rather than, say, the subjective testimony of
a believer or a relevant religious source that, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has remarked, would ultimately be "incomprehensible" to the
nonbeliever-not to mention the Court itself.2 79 In this way, the
adoption of immutability could "ultimately reflect no more than a Bal-
kanized view of the individual in a society in which common under-
standings are unachievable. 280
In light of the foregoing mutability discussion, it should be noted
that the sponsors of WRFA 2003 have given no official detailed re-
proof or discussion of the matter. As yet, they have offered no studies
or data, nor have they developed much of any legislative record at
all. 281 This scarcity is certainly not rare in the accommodation of re-
discrimination."). As described in the "belief" discussion in Part V.A above (as well as
notes 71 and 212), this "postjudice" can also be seen in Hardison's "de minimis" level
of accommodation. However, once again, the higher "significant difficulty or ex-
pense" standard is what would really give tangible strength to any such notion.
278 SeeJamar, supra note 33, at 747 (arguing that disability is an unavoidable status,
unlike religious belief).
279 According to relevant EEOC ADA guidelines, " [w] hen the disability is not obvi-
ous," employers may require documentation "about the disability and . . .the func-
tional limitations ... from an appropriate health care or rehabilitation professional"
that may even be of the employers' choosing. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902,
6908A, at 5467-8 (2003). In the religion context, "[w]hile an employer may argue
that an employee's adherence to a religious practice is fraudulent [i.e., a matter of
sincerity], the courts virtually never reject an employee's assertion that a need for
accommodation was derived from a religious belief." WOLF ET AL., supra note 8, at 29.
In this sense, as the Supreme Court once noted, "[r]eligious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others." United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944), quoted in Garvey, supra note 24, at 798; see also Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What principle of law or logic can be
brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to
his personal faith?"); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 449 (1988) ("This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs
that led to the religious objections here .... ."); EEOC v. Uni6n Independiente de la
Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (Ist Cir. 2002) ("Religious
beliefs protected by Title VII need not be 'acceptable, logical, consistent, or compre-
hensible to others....'") (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
280 Marshall, supra note 40, at 36.
281 Cf Workplace Religious Freedom Act: Hearing on S. 1124 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Res., 105th Cong. 32-69 (1997) (presenting a rather limited record
in support of such legislation in 1997); 149 CONG. Ruc. S5352-53 (daily ed. Apr. 11,
2003) (statements of Sens. Santorum & Kerry) (same for legislation in 2003). For
some history of earlier versions, see 148 CONG. REc. S4865 (daily ed. May 23, 2002)
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ligion field, not to mention the inclusion of religion in Title VII to
begin with, 28 2 nor should it be terribly surprising given the potentially
"incomprehensible" nature of the question in the first place.283 None-
theless, at a minimum, the absence of a definitive conclusion on the
point does bring into doubt the wisdom of imposing certain costs for
an uncertain reason, if, in fact, immutability is the theoretical basis for
the Act's proposal. Of course, as we will now explore, perhaps it does
not take all the credit (or blame).
As noted above, even if mutability is conceded, a supporter of the
Act might say, "even so, it's so important we should protect it any-
way"-the "personal rights" theory. In support, one might try to posit
that accommodation reflects a "long history of considering religious
observance a fundamental right."28 4 The problem with this line of
argument, however, is that until 1972,285 such a "right," even if it oth-
erwise existed, never applied to employment in any general (or, for
that matter, federal) manner.2 86 In advocating their respective
amendments, both Senators Randolph and Santorum asserted the
"fundamental right" of religious freedom in one way or another. For
example, and as mentioned above, Senator Randolph suggested that
section 701 (j) is "what the Founding Fathers intended,"287 while Sena-
tor Santorum opined that WRFA 2003 concerns the "first freedom" of
(statement of Sen. Kerry); 145 CONG. REC. S11,647-48 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999)
(statements of Sens. Kerry, Brownback & Lieberman); 144 CONG. REc. 145 (1998)
(statement of Rep. Goodling); 143 CONG. REc. 24,533 (1997) (statement of Sen. Mi-
kulski); 143 CONG. REc. 17,270-72 (1997) (statements of Sens. Kerry & Coats); 143
CONG. REC. 834-35 (1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry); 142 CONG. REC. 23,038 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kerry); and 140 CONG. REC. 28,740 (1994) (statement of Rep.
Nadler).
282. See Post, supra note 42, at 180-81 ("The legislative history of religious discrimi-
nation under Title VII is, therefore, deeply ambiguous.").
283 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.
284 Moberly, supra note 32, at 2-3 (quoting Frantz, supra note 227, at 206 n.8).
285 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)); see also Edwards & Kaplan, supra
note 43, at 600-02 n.10 (showing that consideration of religious discrimination in
congressional debates of the 1964 bill was extremely limited).
286 Cf Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334 F.3d 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the
lack of Title VII "legislative record" on religious discrimination); Edwards & Kaplan,
supra note 43, at 600 (noting that Congress did not bother to seriously "consider or
document the problem"). Indeed the discussion cited for the "fundamental right"
proposition itself, see Moberly, supra note 32, at 2-3; supra note 284 and accompany-
ing text, is largely supported by constitutional, not legislative, thought. See Edwards &
Kaplan, supra note 43, at 602-04.
287 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
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religious exercise.288 As laudable as these aspirations may seem, there
is simply no historical support to them as applied to the workplace,
not to mention any "significant" accommodation therein.2 89
Despite the lack of a particular historical pedigree to the "per-
sonal rights" theory in employment, one might still argue that, never-
theless, the theory is supported by similar treatment of a range of
other rights that, while admittedly based on mutable or volitional ac-
tivity, nevertheless provide protection in the marketplace. Examples
of such "act-based" protections include collective labor action,290 mili-
tary service, 29 1 jury duty,292 family leave,29 3 whistleblowing,2 94 and, al-
though not protected on the federal level but in many states, marital
status.295 The problem with this argument, however, is that each of
the foregoing involves a more direct (and, dare say, substantial) "state
interest" apart from the exercise of the particular individual right at
issue. For example, jury duty is protected for "the maintenance and
288 149 CONG. REc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
289 In fact, as described below, there is little historical basis for even using these
arguments in support of accommodation in the constitutional realm. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (denying "remedial" basis for Congress to
impose RFRA religious exemptions on applicable state laws); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (citing "constitutional tradition" in rejecting religious
exemptions from state narcotics law); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878) (denying religious exemptions from federal polygamy law); Endres, 334 F.3d at
629-30 (discussing distinction between constitutional "neutrality" and Title VII
"accommodation").
290 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000).
291 See Uniformed Services Employment and Restoration Rights Act of 1994
(USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311-4319 (2000). USERRA contains both "reasonable"
and "undue hardship" qualifiers on the "accommodation" of reinstatement following
military service. Id. at § 4312(d) (1).
292 SeeJury Systems Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000) (prohibiting dis-
crimination against jury service, and essentially guaranteeing treatment as if on
leave).
293 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (protecting, among
other things, leave to attend to a sick relative (i.e., volitional at least as to employee)).
294 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (retaliation under Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (outlining Title VII retaliation provi-
sion); ESTRE CHER & IRLPER supra note 25, at 728 ("Virtually every federal health and
safety law contains an antiretaliation provision .... ").
295 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,940 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, §§ 14, 16(a)(1) (Michie 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West
2001); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(1) (A) (McKinney
2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (Michie 2001); cf CASTAGNERA ET AL., supra note 36,
10,020 ("[Although federal law does not forbid marital discrimination directly,] an
employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women, but
which does not affect the employment of married men constitutes sex discrimination,
according to the EEOC.").
2004] 1071
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
independence of the judicial system,"296 family leave to "dismantle
persisting gender-based barriers" in leave policies,2 97 and collective la-
bor activity for "industrial peace."298 Moreover, of those listed above,
only military service imposes a "significant difficulty or expense" ac-
commodation test,29 9 with the high level state interest in that area
rather self-evident.
Although arguments concerning a state interest in religious plu-
ralism have been raised since the Founding,300 such an interest is not
reflected in any findings under the Act and has been asserted in sup-
port only in passing. 30 1 Furthermore, no such state interest (as op-
posed to individual) has been raised that rises to the level of those
actions described above that are otherwise protected by federal law in
the workplace. Even leaving constitutionality aside, the primary state
interest (or "secular purpose") of the Act would presumably be the
same as that of "de minimis" section 701 (j), namely, the "elimination
of discrimination in the workplace. ' 30 2 As discussed in the previous
296 CASTAGNERA ET AL., supra note 36, 10,032 (quoting Lucas v. Matlack, Inc,,
851 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. W. Va. 1993)).
297 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1981 n.10 (2003).
298 NLRB v. Americare-New Lexington Health Care Ctr., 124 F.3d 753, 758 (6th
Cir. 1997).
299 See38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1) (2000).
300 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), cited in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) (proposing that "the effects of
religious factionalism are best restrained through competition among a multiplicity of
religious sects").
301 With regard to "pluralism" as a state interest, Senator Santorum asserted that
"religious pluralism is one of the great strengths of this country," yet he focused on
"freedom of conscience" and "freedom to exercise one's religion." 149 CONG. REC.
S5352-53 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum). Similarly mixed,
yet individual-focused statements have been made in support of earlier versions of the
Act. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. S11648 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman) (noting that America "is a deeply religious nation," yet focusing on the
"ability to worship freely"); 143 CONG. REc. 17,271-72 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Coats) (citing notion of "religious faith enrich[ing] our common life," yet focusing
on "avoiding the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or theirjob"); see also 143
CONG. REC. 24,533 (1997) (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (focusing exclusively on "re-
ligious accommodation" as "a cherished right").
302 EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., 849 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing the "secu-
lar purpose" of section 701(j)). In her concurring opinion in Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., Justice O'Connor seemed to refer to both "pluralism" and nondiscrimina-
tion in stating, "[i]n my view, a statute outlawing employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assur-
ing employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society." 472 U.S. 703,
712 (1985) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 90 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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Part, such a strictly antiprejudice purpose is rather dubious in light of
the "significant" benefits afforded by the Act to the religious practi-
tioner.303 In a similar manner, even if pluralism were to ultimately
replace nondiscrimination as the operative state interest, its method
(and even, perhaps, its goal) of free competition and equal treatment
would also conflict with the model advocated by the Act. 30 4
In addition to mutability and "personal rights" issues, a final theo-
retical concern with the "significant difficulty or expense" standard
proposed by WRFA 2003 is that it is inconsistent with analogous
church-state jurisprudence in the constitutional arena. This conflict
can be seen in two ways. First, the Act contradicts the "neutrality prin-
ciple" (or "equal treatment" principle) that pervades the present Su-
preme Court's approach to First Amendment issues,305 including
issues involving "accommodation" by the government itself,30 6 at least
for state law purposes.307 Second, the Act's accommodation proposal
303 See also Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334 F.3d 618, 630 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
that "neutrality [that is] necessary to avoid disparate treatment... differs substantially
from accommodation"). In fact, even when referring only to the "stingy application
by the Supreme Court" of the current section 701(j), Kent Greenawalt has com-
mented that "I do not believe the language of Title VII's accommodation section...
can be justified as a simple anti-discrimination law." Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and
Religious Liberty, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2001).
304 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452 (citing "competition" as the pluralism method in a
"diverse society," even in the constitutional context).
305 Neutrality is a critical element in jurisprudence under the Free Exercise
Clause, see, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("[T]he right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability ... ') (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982)); cf Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
232-33 (2000) (stating that "viewpoint neutrality" insulates the state from a First
Amendment challenge), and the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 838 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have emphasized a pro-
gram's neutrality repeatedly in our decisions approving various forms of school aid.");
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) ("A central
lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding government programs
in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.").
306 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
307 It should be noted that in rejecting the challenge to Smith posed by RFRA, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), the Court in City of Boerne only rejected the application of
RFRA's "compelling interest" to state zoning law, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536, not
necessarily to the federal law. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.
2002) ("The U.S. Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the
states .... ."); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,
1120 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We have held, along with most other courts, that the Supreme
Court invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local law."), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
958 (2001). Thus, as indicated above, see supra note 35, RFRA's requirement of a
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runs counter to the act-status (or belief-practice) distinction deemed
critical by the Court in distinguishing between improper intentional
discrimination against religion generally and permissible ancillary
burdens to religious practice.3 0 8
As the Supreme Court opined in Smith, "if prohibiting the exer-
cise of religion is not the object of the [relevant state action] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. 30 9 Oth-
erwise, as the Court asserted over a century ago in the landmark polyg-
amy case of Reynolds v. United States, religion based exceptions to
neutral, generally applicable laws would "permit every citizen to be-
come a law unto himself."310 Moreover, as it posited further in the
federal highway case of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, "government simply could not operate if it were required to sat-
isfy every citizen's religious needs and desires. 311
In church-state jurisprudence, the intended target is the inten-
tional discrimination of religion, 31 2 not a failure to accommodate its
practices. 313 As Judge Learned Hand once noted in distinguishing
discrimination from accommodation in this context, "[t]he First
Amendment protects one against action by the government... but it
gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own inter-
ests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessi-
ties. 13 14 Professor Carter explains the concept of neutrality further:
"Neutrality treats religious belief as a matter of individual choice, an
aspect of conscience, with which the government must not interfere
but which it has no obligation to respect. '3 15 Although this jurispru-
"compelling state interest" might apply to relevant federal workplace rules, although
the Senate Report suggests otherwise. Rosenzweig, supra note 35, at 2526.
308 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 ("When the exercise of religion has been
burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it does not follow that
the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let alone bur-
dened because of their religious beliefs."); Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79 (finding that
"[t]he government may not . . . impose special disabilities on the basis of religious
views or religious status," but may enact "generally applicable" laws that have only an
"incidental effect" on religious practice).
309 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
310 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
311 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
312 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.").
313 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-31.
314 Otten v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953), quoted in Edwards &
Kaplan, supra note 43, at 599; see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,
710 (1985) (quoting the same Hand passage).
315 CARTER, supra note 79, at 134.
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dence is not directly on point (except perhaps to the extent that the
"significant difficulty or expense" standard itself might be constitu-
tionally suspect) ,316 it provides remarkable insight into the constitu-
tional approach to the relevant issues, an approach that is marked by
neutrality and equal treatment, rather than by special accommodation
and affirmative action.317
Upon constitutional reflection, one cannot help but confront the
conclusion that what seems to be the law for the state generally might
not be the law for employers under the Act.3 18 Curiously, it is possible
that the First Amendment itself could be to blame. However one
views this result as a normative matter, it places not only the com-
ments on "religious freedom" by both Senators Randolph and
Santorum, but also the question of the entire approach to be taken by
the Act on such matters,319 in a very interesting light.
C. Rights, Ideas, and the Marketplace
As Judge Learned Hand commented further in the Otten case
cited above, "[w] e must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as
well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life; and
we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices this may require beyond
our satisfactions from within, or our expectations of a better world."3 20
The approach taken by the Act is, of course, antithetical to Judge
Hand's approach, and similarly, through its "de minimis" accommo-
dation standard, that taken by the Court in Hardison. This is not to
suggest that voluntary employer accommodation, either on its own ini-
tiative or as the result of bargaining, collective or otherwise, is neither
desirable nor commendable. Rather, it is a matter of state power and
316 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
317 One might argue that "neutrality" is inoperative in the Court's own "accommo-
dation" in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987), of the exemption for religious employers from the
religion provisions of Title VII under section 702. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
Although this argument is logical, it ignores both the potential entanglement of
church and state and the distinction between state and private regulation of religious
exercise. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337-38 ("For a law to have forbidden 'effects' . . . the
government itself [must advance] religion through its own activities and influence.").
318 Again, as discussed above, see supra note 35, even WRFA 2003's very application
to state and local employers is jeopardized by the "neutrality principle" holding in
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
319 See 149 CONG. Rrc. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Santorum); 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972); Engle, supra note 32, at 320 (noting that Title
VII requires employers to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees).
320 Otten v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953), quoted in Edwards &
Kaplan, supra note 43, at 599.
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the limits of individual rights, and the "significant difficulty or ex-
pense" standard of religious accommodation proposed by the Act may
very well infringe upon an opportunity that would be best left in the
hands of the marketplace, one not only of business but of ideas as
well.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has argued in emphasizing the dan-
gers of a culture defined solely by individual rights, without any no-
tion of duties or concepts of community, that "[o]ur rights talk, in its
absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social con-
flict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accom-
modation, or at least the discovery of common ground."3 21 Although
perhaps speaking to a different end, Professor Jamar has noted that
"[s]ociety is to be ordered and truth is to be ascertained through the
tugs and shoves of thoughts in the marketplace of ideas." 322 Indeed, if
religion really is "incomprehensible" to the nonbeliever 323 and "need
not be 'acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others,'"3 2 4 or something about which even the Supreme Court itself
cannot "determine the truth,"325 why not permit an otherwise free
market (that ostensibly already strives to eliminate irrational prejudice
against beliefs, status, or practices, 3 26 and strives for freedom from the
coercive power of the state) 327 to deal neutrally and equally with the
actions of all of its participants, whether religious or not. That, in fact,
is the very principle that lies at the "core" of not only relevant Ameri-
can economic and constitutional systems generally,3 28 but more par-
ticularly, the further enhancement thereof through the
antidiscrimination principles of Title VII itself.3 29
321 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 14 (1991).
322 Jamar, supra note 33, at 728.
323 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
324 EEOC v. Uni6n Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantaril-
lados, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employ-
ment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
325 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
326 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Post, supra note 31, at
8.
327 See Marshall, supra note 40, at 20 (noting that one of the justifications for the
First Amendment is that an effort by government "to coerce belief... is the hallmark
of a feudal or totalitarian society") (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 21 (1970)).
328 As Professor Marshall notes, "[t]o the framers, [free interchange] and mutual
understanding had value not only because of its role in persuading others or in being
persuaded, but also because it was seen to be of inherent worth... " Marshall, supra
note 40, at 37.
329 See Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante),
76 GEo. L.J. 1691, 1707 (1988) (discussing the "core prohibition of Title VII against
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In attempting to resolve the accommodation question, reflections
on John Stuart Mill's "marketplace of ideas" theory, and its limita-
tions, might prove helpful (although distinctions of state versus pri-
vate and belief versus action must be recalled given that the ideas
offered by Mill and others in this area generally concerned "public
speech," not "private action," not to mention the accommodation
thereof). In this, Mill argued that silencing individual expression hin-
ders the advancement of a free people, for "if the opinion is right,
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose, what is -almost as great a benefit, the clearer percep-
tion and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."330 This well known notion echoes throughout the history of
"free speech" thought, from Thomas Jefferson ("public judgment will
correct false reasonings and opinions, on a full hearing of all par-
ties") 331 to Oliver Wendell Holmes ("the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket") 332 to the Supreme Court itself in its reflections on James
Madison's The Federalist No. 10 ("the effects of religious factionalism
are best restrained through competition among a multiplicity of relig-
ious sects") 33
Of course, the foregoing is not intended to suggest that the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" theory is without limits or its host of critics. 33 4 In
fact, even Mill himself once remarked that "the dictum that truth al-
ways triumphs over persecution" is "one of those pleasant false-
hoods."33 5 Nevertheless, whatever conclusions one makes on the
"marketplace" theory of speech within the public square, it is in-
an employer who discriminates against adherents of particular religions purely for
invidious reasons").
330 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1978) (1859).
331 Kevin Francis O'Neill, Muzzling Death Row Inmates: Applying the First Amendment
to Regulations that Restrict a Condemned Prisoner's Last Words, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1159, 1184
n.169 (2001) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's second inaugural address in SAUL K. PADO-
VER, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 132 (1965)).
332 Id. at 1184 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
333 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
334 See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 331, at 1184 n.172 (citing, inter alia, Harry H.
Wellington, On.Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979): "[T]oo many
false ideas have captured the imagination of man.").
335 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 89 (Pelican Classics 1980) (1859) (emphasis
added), quoted in Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Juris-
prudence: A Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729,
765 (2000).
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sightful to reflect on the resultantly narrower position taken (inten-
tionally or not) by WRFA 2003, not only as to workplace speech itself,
but also to religious conduct generally. 336 As Professor Jamar has ob-
served, "[t]hese assertions of individual rights could exacerbate de-
clining social harmony," thus implicating community and state
interests as well. 33 7
Thus, the "marketplace of ideas" perspective on WRFA 2003 ex-
poses a conflict between relevant assertions of individual "rights" of
significant accommodation and the development of a general culture
of freedom and equality. More specifically, however, it also provides
an important perspective on the various players in the drama, namely
the employees, the employer, religion, and the state. For the individ-
ual, the Act seemingly provides much promise in affording greater
rights in one's engagement in religious activities. The "marketplace"
problem, though, is that not only do these "rights" place their bearer
in a possible haven that might risk one's ultimate growth in "truth, 338
but also such "rights" under the Act's accommodation standard con-
template a special treatment that may not be shared by other "individ-
uals" (e.g., coworkers).3 39
As far as employers are concerned, the most obvious conse-
quence of the Act is a heavier burden, whether administratively, finan-
cially, and/or operationally. In the realm of ideas and rights,
however, the Act also imposes great costs. At least in the private work-
place, both employer and "employee have the right to exercise their
religious beliefs and . . . one or the other must either give way com-
pletely or one or the other or both must give way partially through
accommodation." 340 Moreover, the duty that an employer has to
other employees in the form of maintaining a workplace free from
336 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected
Speech?, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 979-83 (1999) (discussing both religious
speech and religious conduct generally in light of an earlier version of WRFA 2003).
337 Jamar, supra note 33, at 725.
338 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas .... ").
339 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (holding
that preferential treatment cannot be given to employees because of their religious
beliefs).
340 Jamar, supra note 33, at 724-25. Further heightening this conflict, Professor
Jamar opines that "[t]he religious freedom interests of the employer and the em-
ployee are both of the first magnitude." Id. at 727.
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religious hostility (typically through proselytization) may also be se-
verely compromised. 34 1
Finally, in terms of the relationship between church and state, the
Act proposes a radical vision. On the state side, the neutrality other-
wise espoused under a "marketplace of ideas" theory of the First
Amendment would be undercut by the Act's promotion of religious
activity in the workplace. In fact, even if one were to accept the pedi-
gree of "a wall of separation between Church & State," a history
brought into extreme doubt by the recent scholarship of Professor
Philip Hamburger, 342 such meddling in religion, even on a "neutral"
basis, would seem inconsistent with such a theory of separation. At
the practical level alone, the terms of the Act would demand a judicial
assessment of religious issues (e.g., sincerity) on a scale that has never
been seen before. On the church side, the great political philosopher
Alexis de Tocqueville once warned of the risks of religion's reliance
on the "artificial strength of laws." 343 Under the Act, this "artificial"
insulation from the consequences of the marketplace may ultimately
lead to the spiritual atrophy that typically results from a state's indul-
gence of religion.
In sum, the accommodation standard of WRFA 2003, in focusing
on the "tree" of individual rights, seems to miss the "forest" of the
placement of such rights in the larger community. This placement
not only risks adverse consequences for others, but poses substantial
harms to the individual as well. As Professor William Marshall once
observed in the First Amendment context, " [t] he search for truth the-
ory emphasizes freedom and autonomy consonant with liberalism, yet
reins in many of the excesses of individualism by suggesting, in accord
with principles of civic virtue, that the individual may be bound by
concerns beyond her self-interest."3 44 Thus, the cost of accommoda-
tion under the Act may be even greater than an employer's "signifi-
cant difficulty or expense."
CONCLUSION
In closing, it is the status quo mixture of nondiscrimination and
"de minimis" accommodation (with anything beyond that being en-
341 See DelPo, supra note 45, at 349 (noting that an employer accommodating em-
ployee proselytizing risks harassment claims from other employees).
342 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 481 (2002) (con-
cluding that "the constitutional authority for separation is without historical
foundation").
343 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 297 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1835).
344 Marshall, supra note 40, at 34.
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tirely voluntary) 345 that best suits the relevant balance between indi-
vidual religious rights and the common good. The essential division
between status and action that presently operates through the
"prejudice model" not only properly fulfills the objectives of Tide VII,
but also respects all relevant interests at stake. Employees are pro-
tected from irrational decisions based on matters arguably beyond
their control, employers are afforded discretion appropriate to the
operation of a free and fair market, the rights of coworkers are safe-
guarded, and the interests of church and state are addressed in a spirit
of neutrality and equal treatment.
By its "significant difficulty or expense" test, WRFA 2003 would
fundamentally disrupt the present balance. In encouraging a model
of immutability for religious action and/or imposing an unprece-
dented theory of personal rights, the Act holds much danger for em-
ployers, employees, religion, the state, and society generally. The
economic costs of the Act (which, once again, could cover up to 147
million persons) are not at all clear, nor have its supporters put forth
a figure.3 4 6 Yet, whatever they are, the cost to authentic religious lib-
erty within a free economy would be far greater. In the end, the level
of affirmative action demanded of employers by the Act simply cannot
stand.
345 Indeed, even as Senator Santorum himself acknowledges, "most private em-
ployers" already voluntarily accommodate. 149 CONG. REc. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11,
2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
346 See, e.g., id. at S5352-53 (statements of Sens. Santorum & Kerry).
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